We’ve been talking as though there was one “real” me and several xeroxes, but you seem to be acting as if that were the case on a moral level, which seems wrong. Surely, if I fork myself, each branch is just as genuinely me as any other? If I build and lock a cage, arrange to fork myself with one copy inside the cage and one outside, press the fork button, and find myself inside the cage, then I’m the one who locked myself in.
Surely, if I fork myself, each branch is just as genuinely me as any other?
Fundamental disagreement here, which I don’t expect to work through. Once you fork yourself, I would treat each copy as a unique individual. (It’s irrelevant whether one of you is “real” or not. They’re identical people, but they’re still separate people).
If those people all actually make the same decisions, great. I am not okay with exposing hundreds of copies to years of torture based on a decision you made in the comfort of your computer room.
I don’t ask you to accept that the various post-fork copies are the same person as each other, only that each is (perhaps non-transitively) the same person as the single pre-fork copy.
Suppose I don’t fork myself, but lock myself in a cage. Does the absence of an uncaged copy matter?
We’ve been talking as though there was one “real” me and several xeroxes, but you seem to be acting as if that were the case on a moral level, which seems wrong. Surely, if I fork myself, each branch is just as genuinely me as any other? If I build and lock a cage, arrange to fork myself with one copy inside the cage and one outside, press the fork button, and find myself inside the cage, then I’m the one who locked myself in.
Fundamental disagreement here, which I don’t expect to work through. Once you fork yourself, I would treat each copy as a unique individual. (It’s irrelevant whether one of you is “real” or not. They’re identical people, but they’re still separate people).
If those people all actually make the same decisions, great. I am not okay with exposing hundreds of copies to years of torture based on a decision you made in the comfort of your computer room.
I don’t ask you to accept that the various post-fork copies are the same person as each other, only that each is (perhaps non-transitively) the same person as the single pre-fork copy.
Suppose I don’t fork myself, but lock myself in a cage. Does the absence of an uncaged copy matter?