I agree that there is some ambiguity, but I am not convinced that that position can be held so consistently as you suggest.
Let me first of all say that of course a Christian may make every effort to enter through the narrow door for reasons other than their personal welfare. I take it the question is whether they can be moved by the prospect of their own damnation while also thinking an empty hell likely.
Now, there are two different ways in which you could think an empty hell likely but not certain. (1) You could be uncertain between (a) lots of people in hell, with no realistic prospect of escape, and (b) some process that usually or always makes hell end up empty; or (2) you could be confident that the latter is the case, but think that in some cases the process might fail.
I don’t think branch 1 is actually relevant to this discussion—because if you think (1a) is a thing you think it’s plausible that God might do or allow, you’re right back in that “morally monstrous” box. So let’s consider branch 2.
What that means is that the danger of any given individual getting stuck in hell eternally is small enough that it’s likely that everyone gets out. Let’s suppose the total number of people ever to live is 100 billion = 10^11; then, crudely, that means that any individual’s risk of not getting out is no worse than about 1 chance in 10^-11.
And if the individual wondering about this is a Christian, making at least a typical-Christian effort to live a life pleasing to God, and thinks that the system in question was set up by that same God with the intention of incentivising God-pleasing behaviour … well, then surely they have to reckon their own chances considerably better than average.
So then the question is: how much actual incentive does, say, a 10^-12 probability of eternal damnation produce? Surely very little, not least because it’s kinda lost in the noise compared with other improbable ways of ending up eternally damned (some other nastier religion could be right, we could all end up in eternal-torture simulations by hostile AIs, etc.).
I think a Christian who seriously embraced the idea that an eternal hell exists but is likely to end up empty should not, and in most cases would not, be materially motivated by fear of ending up in hell.
I agree that there is some ambiguity, but I am not convinced that that position can be held so consistently as you suggest.
Let me first of all say that of course a Christian may make every effort to enter through the narrow door for reasons other than their personal welfare. I take it the question is whether they can be moved by the prospect of their own damnation while also thinking an empty hell likely.
Now, there are two different ways in which you could think an empty hell likely but not certain. (1) You could be uncertain between (a) lots of people in hell, with no realistic prospect of escape, and (b) some process that usually or always makes hell end up empty; or (2) you could be confident that the latter is the case, but think that in some cases the process might fail.
I don’t think branch 1 is actually relevant to this discussion—because if you think (1a) is a thing you think it’s plausible that God might do or allow, you’re right back in that “morally monstrous” box. So let’s consider branch 2.
What that means is that the danger of any given individual getting stuck in hell eternally is small enough that it’s likely that everyone gets out. Let’s suppose the total number of people ever to live is 100 billion = 10^11; then, crudely, that means that any individual’s risk of not getting out is no worse than about 1 chance in 10^-11.
And if the individual wondering about this is a Christian, making at least a typical-Christian effort to live a life pleasing to God, and thinks that the system in question was set up by that same God with the intention of incentivising God-pleasing behaviour … well, then surely they have to reckon their own chances considerably better than average.
So then the question is: how much actual incentive does, say, a 10^-12 probability of eternal damnation produce? Surely very little, not least because it’s kinda lost in the noise compared with other improbable ways of ending up eternally damned (some other nastier religion could be right, we could all end up in eternal-torture simulations by hostile AIs, etc.).
I think a Christian who seriously embraced the idea that an eternal hell exists but is likely to end up empty should not, and in most cases would not, be materially motivated by fear of ending up in hell.