I don’t think that disbelief in P-zombies belongs on this list. Or, it belongs on the list only in the sense in which Chalmers himself disbelieves in P-zombies. Chalmers doesn’t think that P-zombies might actually exist in the real world. Rather, he thinks that P-zombies could have existed had the universe been governed by different laws. In other words, his “belief” in P-zombies is an artifact of how he assigns truth-values to counterfactuals.
I agree that he makes these truth-value assignments in a wrong way. But he doesn’t really believe in P-zombies. He doesn’t believe that they are actual. He does believe that they are possible-but-not-actual. In general, the mistake that P-zombie believers make is a mistake about how to think about counterfactuals. Not making that mistake might be a “slam dunk”. If it’s not, then P-zombie disbelief isn’t either.
I also agree that Chalmers’s beliefs about P-zombies lead him to make certain actually-incorrect metaphysical assertions. But these assertions are wrong in the same sense that your belief in a subjective thread of consciousness is wrong. [ETA: I’m not saying that you think about counterfactuals wrongly. You take exactly the right approach to them in my book.]
There’s another possible belief, p-zombies-aren’t-possible-but-I’d-sure-like-to-know-why; that is, that while the existence of non-zombies proves the impossibility of any world with zombies, it is still possible to (counter-factually) conceive of an existence where it was the other way around. Though there would have been nobody to wonder about it.
I’ve talked to a number of apparent p-zombie believers who, under careful questioning, turn out to be asking this question instead. I’m pretty sure it’s not the same question.
I don’t think that disbelief in P-zombies belongs on this list. Or, it belongs on the list only in the sense in which Chalmers himself disbelieves in P-zombies. Chalmers doesn’t think that P-zombies might actually exist in the real world. Rather, he thinks that P-zombies could have existed had the universe been governed by different laws. In other words, his “belief” in P-zombies is an artifact of how he assigns truth-values to counterfactuals.
I agree that he makes these truth-value assignments in a wrong way. But he doesn’t really believe in P-zombies. He doesn’t believe that they are actual. He does believe that they are possible-but-not-actual. In general, the mistake that P-zombie believers make is a mistake about how to think about counterfactuals. Not making that mistake might be a “slam dunk”. If it’s not, then P-zombie disbelief isn’t either.
I also agree that Chalmers’s beliefs about P-zombies lead him to make certain actually-incorrect metaphysical assertions. But these assertions are wrong in the same sense that your belief in a subjective thread of consciousness is wrong. [ETA: I’m not saying that you think about counterfactuals wrongly. You take exactly the right approach to them in my book.]
There’s another possible belief, p-zombies-aren’t-possible-but-I’d-sure-like-to-know-why; that is, that while the existence of non-zombies proves the impossibility of any world with zombies, it is still possible to (counter-factually) conceive of an existence where it was the other way around. Though there would have been nobody to wonder about it.
I’ve talked to a number of apparent p-zombie believers who, under careful questioning, turn out to be asking this question instead. I’m pretty sure it’s not the same question.