Don’t the physical facts underdetermine what computation (‘abstracted idealized dynamic’) my brain might be interpreted as performing?
I would think they do in the same sense that the physical facts always underdetermine the computations that the universe is actually performing. That’s obviously a problem with trying to implement anything—though how much of a problem depends on how robust your implementation is to having the wrong model: bridges still stand, even though we don’t have a perfect model of the universe. But it doesn’t strike me as a problem with the theory per se
(I’m not sure whether you were suggesting it was.)
Don’t the physical facts underdetermine what computation (‘abstracted idealized dynamic’) my brain might be interpreted as performing?
I would think they do in the same sense that the physical facts always underdetermine the computations that the universe is actually performing. That’s obviously a problem with trying to implement anything—though how much of a problem depends on how robust your implementation is to having the wrong model: bridges still stand, even though we don’t have a perfect model of the universe. But it doesn’t strike me as a problem with the theory per se
(I’m not sure whether you were suggesting it was.)