This means there’s much better reason to think that Omega will actually reward you in an alternate universe than Nomega.
That’s exactly what others are saying about priors. But really, it’s about your probabilities (including posteriors once someone appears). The “simple hack decision theory” works for all of these cases—multiply the conditional probability by the value of each possible outcome, and pick the condition that’s gives the largest utility-contribution.
If you assign a much lower probability to nomega than to omega, and assign a high probability of honesty to the setup, you want to pay. With other beliefs, you might not.
That’s exactly what others are saying about priors
It’s not the same thing. Other people are correctly pointing out that UDT’s behavior here depends on the prior. I’m arguing that a prior similar to the one we use in our day-to-day lives would assign greater probability to Omega than Nomega, given that one has seen Omega. The OP can be seen as implicitly about both issues.
That’s exactly what others are saying about priors. But really, it’s about your probabilities (including posteriors once someone appears). The “simple hack decision theory” works for all of these cases—multiply the conditional probability by the value of each possible outcome, and pick the condition that’s gives the largest utility-contribution.
If you assign a much lower probability to nomega than to omega, and assign a high probability of honesty to the setup, you want to pay. With other beliefs, you might not.
It’s not the same thing. Other people are correctly pointing out that UDT’s behavior here depends on the prior. I’m arguing that a prior similar to the one we use in our day-to-day lives would assign greater probability to Omega than Nomega, given that one has seen Omega. The OP can be seen as implicitly about both issues.