I don’t understand why you say “should be difficult to distinguish” rather than “are difficult”, why you seem to think finding the truth isn’t difficult, or what you think truthseeking consists of.
Because it feels like it’s a choice whether or not I want to consider truth-seeking to be difficult. You are trying to convince me that I should consider it difficult, so that means I have the option to or not. If it simply is difficult, you don’t need to try and convince me of that, it would be obvious on it’s own.
In addition to that, “should be” means that I think something ought to be a certain way. It certainly would be better if truth-seeking weren’t difficult, wouldn’t you agree?
I didn’t say “false things monetize better than true things”. I would say that technically correct and broadly fair debunkings (or technically correct and broadly fair publications devoted to countering false narratives) don’t monetize well, certainly not to the tune of millions of dollars annually for a single pundit. Provide counterexamples if you have them.
So you’re not saying that false things monetize better than true things, you’re saying that things which correctly state that other things are false monetize worse than that the things that they claim are false. I don’t think I misunderstood you here, but I may have interpreted your meaning more broadly than it was intended.
I would think that how well something monetizes depends on how much people want to hear it. So yes, that would mean that it depends on how good something sounds. Our disagreement is on whether or not how good something sounds has any relation whatsoever to how true it is.
But true claims don’t inherently “sound better”
To be clear, I’m saying that they do, and that this means that truth-seeking isn’t that difficult, and it is counterproductive to believe that it is difficult.
The proof I gave that this is false was convincing to me, and you didn’t rebut it. Here are some examples from my father:
ALL the test animals [in mRNA vaccine trials] died during Covid development.
The FDA [are] not following their own procedures.
There is not a single study that shows [masks] are of benefit.
[Studies] say the jab will result in sterility.
Vaccination usually results in the development of variants.
He loves to say things like this (he can go on and on saying such things; I assume he has it all memorized) and he believes they are true. They must sound good to him. They don’t sound good to me (especially in context). How does this not contradict your view?
it feels like it’s a choice whether or not I want to consider truth-seeking to be difficult.
We should be able to mutually agree on what sounds better. For example, “vaccines work” probably sounds better to us both. People say things that don’t sound good all the time, just because they say it doesn’t mean they also think it sounds good.
Things like “we should be able to figure out the truth as it is relevant to our situation with the capabilities we have” have to sound good to everyone, I would think. That means there’s basis for alignment, here.
Because it feels like it’s a choice whether or not I want to consider truth-seeking to be difficult. You are trying to convince me that I should consider it difficult, so that means I have the option to or not. If it simply is difficult, you don’t need to try and convince me of that, it would be obvious on it’s own.
In addition to that, “should be” means that I think something ought to be a certain way. It certainly would be better if truth-seeking weren’t difficult, wouldn’t you agree?
So you’re not saying that false things monetize better than true things, you’re saying that things which correctly state that other things are false monetize worse than that the things that they claim are false. I don’t think I misunderstood you here, but I may have interpreted your meaning more broadly than it was intended.
I would think that how well something monetizes depends on how much people want to hear it. So yes, that would mean that it depends on how good something sounds. Our disagreement is on whether or not how good something sounds has any relation whatsoever to how true it is.
To be clear, I’m saying that they do, and that this means that truth-seeking isn’t that difficult, and it is counterproductive to believe that it is difficult.
The proof I gave that this is false was convincing to me, and you didn’t rebut it. Here are some examples from my father:
He loves to say things like this (he can go on and on saying such things; I assume he has it all memorized) and he believes they are true. They must sound good to him. They don’t sound good to me (especially in context). How does this not contradict your view?
Agreed, it is.
We should be able to mutually agree on what sounds better. For example, “vaccines work” probably sounds better to us both. People say things that don’t sound good all the time, just because they say it doesn’t mean they also think it sounds good.
Things like “we should be able to figure out the truth as it is relevant to our situation with the capabilities we have” have to sound good to everyone, I would think. That means there’s basis for alignment, here.