The tough part will be guarding against Goodhart’s Law. I suspect that the current system of publications and grant money as an indicator of ability started out as an attempt to improve the efficiency of scientific progress and has by now been thoroughly Goodharted.
As Lumifer points out, tenure was intended to give productive scientists some protected time so they could think. However, the amount of hoops you jump through on the way to getting there puts you through the opposite of protected time so by the time you get tenure you’ve gotten jaded, cynical, and acquired some habits useful for academic survival but harmful to academic excellence.
I think you implicitly paint a too rosy picture of researchers’ psychology. I think that in many cases systems that lack sufficiently strong incentives decrease researchers’ productivity because they don’t have the same need to publish anymore. Most researchers are tempted by other things than science as well and if they are allowed to get away with it they might prioritize those other things.
So the current system is not quite as flawed as many of its detractors claim. We do need incentives, but they need to be tailored in a better way. Specifically, they need to be tailored so that we cram as much as possible out of our most able researchers.
Most researchers are tempted by other things than science as well and if they are allowed to get away with it they might prioritize those other things.
I recommend whippings and an occasional gruesome execution to make sure these uppity researchers don’t imagine they will be allowed to get away with it.
Lol. I don’t think there should be anything controversial with the notion that researchers need incentives though—the same goes for other professions. Some incentives are counter-productive but that does not mean that the best system is one in which researchers are given the same funding whatever their output is.
The tough part will be guarding against Goodhart’s Law. I suspect that the current system of publications and grant money as an indicator of ability started out as an attempt to improve the efficiency of scientific progress and has by now been thoroughly Goodharted.
As Lumifer points out, tenure was intended to give productive scientists some protected time so they could think. However, the amount of hoops you jump through on the way to getting there puts you through the opposite of protected time so by the time you get tenure you’ve gotten jaded, cynical, and acquired some habits useful for academic survival but harmful to academic excellence.
I think you implicitly paint a too rosy picture of researchers’ psychology. I think that in many cases systems that lack sufficiently strong incentives decrease researchers’ productivity because they don’t have the same need to publish anymore. Most researchers are tempted by other things than science as well and if they are allowed to get away with it they might prioritize those other things.
So the current system is not quite as flawed as many of its detractors claim. We do need incentives, but they need to be tailored in a better way. Specifically, they need to be tailored so that we cram as much as possible out of our most able researchers.
I recommend whippings and an occasional gruesome execution to make sure these uppity researchers don’t imagine they will be allowed to get away with it.
Lol. I don’t think there should be anything controversial with the notion that researchers need incentives though—the same goes for other professions. Some incentives are counter-productive but that does not mean that the best system is one in which researchers are given the same funding whatever their output is.
“In this country, we find it wise to hang a professor from time to time to encourage the others.”