Alfano is entirely too strict about knowledge, though he rests comfortably in the philosophical landscape there. “Can we know on the basis of folk intuitions that we have traits” isn’t as interesting of a question when seen in these terms. He does not address the question “Are our folk intuitions about traits strong Bayesian evidence for their existence?” which would be required to dismiss consideration of folk intuitions entirely as he does. Thus, his claim “We need pay no heed to any attempt to defend virtue ethics that appeals only to intuitions about character traits” has not been proven satisfactorily.
Nonetheless, t’s very nice for him that he’s discovered that there are biases. Anyone who believes that virtue ethics is true should certainly be aware of the relevant ones.
I submit that the form of his argument could be used just as well against any knowledge claim using those definitions and picking some relevant biases.
Alfano is entirely too strict about knowledge, though he rests comfortably in the philosophical landscape there. “Can we know on the basis of folk intuitions that we have traits” isn’t as interesting of a question when seen in these terms. He does not address the question “Are our folk intuitions about traits strong Bayesian evidence for their existence?” which would be required to dismiss consideration of folk intuitions entirely as he does. Thus, his claim “We need pay no heed to any attempt to defend virtue ethics that appeals only to intuitions about character traits” has not been proven satisfactorily.
Nonetheless, t’s very nice for him that he’s discovered that there are biases. Anyone who believes that virtue ethics is true should certainly be aware of the relevant ones.
I submit that the form of his argument could be used just as well against any knowledge claim using those definitions and picking some relevant biases.