Yeah I do find that comment/concept important. I think I basically already counting that class of thing in the list of positive things I’d mentioned elsethread, but yes, I am grateful to you for that. (Benquo being one to say it in that context is a bit more evidence of it’s weight which I had missed before, but I do think I was already weighting the concept approximately the right amount for the right reasons. Partly from having already generally updated on some parts of the Benquo worldview)
Please note, my point in linking that comment wasn’t to suggest that the things Benquo wrote are necessarily true and that the purported truth of those assertions, in itself, bears on the current situation. (Certainly I do agree with what he wrote—but then, I would, wouldn’t I?)
Rather, I was making a meta-level point. Namely: your thesis is that there is some behavior on my part which is bad, and that what makes it bad is that it makes post authors feel… bad in some way (“attacked”? “annoyed”? “discouraged”? I couldn’t say what the right adjective is, here), and that as a consequence, they stop posting on Less Wrong. And as the primary example of this purported bad behavior, you linked the discussion in the comments of the “Zetetic Explanation” post by Benquo (which resulted in the mod warning you noted).
But the comment which I linked has Benquo writing, mere months afterward, that the sort of critique/objection/commentary which I write (including the sort which I wrote in response to his aforesaid post) is “helpful and important”, “very important to the success of an epistemic community”, etc. (Which, I must note, is tremendously to Benquo’s credit. I have the greatest respect for anyone who can view, and treat, their sometime critics in such a fair-minded way.)
This seems like very much the opposite of leaving Less Wrong as a result of my commenting style.
It seems to me that when the prime example you provide of my participation in discussions on Less Wrong purportedly being the sort of thing that drive authors away, actually turns out to be an example of exactly the opposite—of an author (whose post I criticized, in somewhat harsh terms) fairly soon (months) thereafter saying that my critical comments are good and important to the community and that I should continue…
… well, then regardless of whether you agree with the author in question about whether or not my comments are good/important/whatever, the fact that he holds this view casts very serious doubt on your thesis. Wouldn’t you agree?
(And this, note, is an author who has written many posts, many of them quite highly upvoted, and whose writings I have often seen cited in all sorts of significant discussions, i.e., one who has contributed substantially to Less Wrong.)
The reason it’s not additional evidence to me is that I, too, find value in the comments you write for the reasons Benquo states, despite also finding them annoying at the time. So, Benquo’s response here seems like an additional instance of my viewpoint here, rather than a counterexample. (though I’m not claiming Benquo agrees with me on everything on this domain)
… well, then regardless of whether you agree with the author in question about whether or not my comments are good/important/whatever, the fact that he holds this view casts very serious doubt on your thesis. Wouldn’t you agree?
Said is asking Ray, not me, but I strongly disagree.
Point 1 is that a black raven is not strong evidence against white ravens. (Said knows this, I think.)
Point 2 is that a behavior which displeases many authors can still be pleasant or valuable to some authors. (Said knows this, I think.)
Point 3 is that benquo’s view on even that specific comment is not the only author-view that matters; benquo eventually being like “this critical feedback was great” does not mean that other authors watching the interaction at the time did not feel “ugh, I sure don’t want to write a post and have to deal with comments like this one.” (Said knows this, I think.)
(Notably, benquo once publicly stated that he suspected a rough interaction would likely have gone much better under Duncan moderation norms specifically; if we’re updating on benquo’s endorsements then it comes out to “both sets of norms useful,” presumably for different things.)
I’d say it casts mild doubt on the thesis, at best, and that the most likely resolution is that Ray ends up feeling something like “yeah, fair, this did not turn out to be the best example,” not “oh snap, you’re right, turns out it was all a house of cards.”
(This will be my only comment in this chain, so as to avoid repeating past cycles.)
Point 1 is that a black raven is not strong evidence against white ravens. (Said knows this, I think.)
A black raven is, indeed, not strong evidence against white ravens. But that’s not quite the right analogy. The more accurate analogy would go somewhat like this:
Alice: White ravens exist! Bob: Yeah? For real? Where, can I see? Alice (looking around and then pointing): Right… there! That one! Bob (peering at the bird in question): But… that raven is actually black? Like, it’s definitely black and not white at all.
Now not only is Bob (once again, as he was at the start) in the position of having exactly zero examples of white ravens (Alice’s one purported example having been revealed to be not an example at all), but—and perhaps even more importantly!—Bob has reason to doubt not only Alice’s possession of any examples of her claim (of white ravens existing), but her very ability to correctly perceive what color any given raven is.
Now if Alice says “Well, I’ve seen a lot of white ravens, though”, Bob might quite reasonably reply: “Have you, though? Really? Because you just said that that raven was white, and it is definitely, totally black.” What’s more, not only Bob but also Alice herself ought rightly to significantly downgrade her confidence in her belief in white ravens (by a degree commensurate with how big a role her own supposed observations of white ravens have played in forming that belief).
Point 2 is that a behavior which displeases many authors can still be pleasant or valuable to some authors. (Said knows this, I think.)
Just so. But, once again, we must make our analysis more specific and more precise in order for it to be useful. There are two points to make in response to this.
First is what I said above: the point is not just that the commenting style/approach in question is valuable to some authors (although even that, by itself, is surely important!), but that it turns out to be valuable specifically to the author who served as an—indeed, as the—example of said commenting style/approach being bad. This calls into question not just the thesis that said approach is bad in general, but also the weight of any purported evidence of the approach’s badness, which comes from the same source as the now-controverted claim that it was bad for that specific author.
Second is that not all authors are equal.
Suppose, for example, that dozens of well-respected and highly valued authors all turned out to condemn my commenting style and my contributions, while those who showed up to defend me were all cranks, trolls, and troublemakers. It would still be true, then, to say that “my comments are valuable to some authors but displease others”, but of course the views of the “some” would be, in any reasonable weighting, vastly and overwhelmingly outweighed by the views of the “others”.
But that, of course, is clearly not what’s happening. And the fact that Benquo is certainly not some crank or troll or troublemaker, but a justly respected and valued contributor, is therefore quite relevant.
Point 3 is that benquo’s view on even that specific comment is not the only author-view that matters; benquo eventually being like “this critical feedback was great” does not mean that other authors watching the interaction at the time did not feel “ugh, I sure don’t want to write a post and have to deal with comments like this one.” (Said knows this, I think.)
First, for clarity, let me note that we are not talking (and Benquo was not talking) about a single specific comment, but many comments—indeed, an entire approach to commenting and forum participation. But that is a detail.
It’s true that Benquo’s own views on the matter aren’t the only relevant ones. But they surely are the most relevant. (Indeed, it’s hard to see how one could claim otherwise.)
And as far as “audience reactions” (so to speak) go, it seems to me that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Indeed, some authors (or potential authors) reading the interaction might have had the reaction you describe. But others could have had the opposite reaction. (And, judging by the comments in that discussion thread—as well as many other comments over the years—others in fact did have the opposite reaction, when reading that discussion and numerous others in which I’ve taken part.) What’s more, it is even possible (and, I think, not at all implausible) that some authors read Benquo’s months-later comment and thought “you know, he’s right”.
(Notably, benquo once publicly stated that he suspected a rough interaction would likely have gone much better under Duncan moderation norms specifically; if we’re updating on benquo’s endorsements then it comes out to “both sets of norms useful,” presumably for different things.)
Well, as I said in the grandparent comment, updating on Benquo’s endorsement is exactly what I was not suggesting that we do. (Not that I am suggesting the opposite—not updating on his endorsement—either. I am only saying that this was not my intended meaning.)
Still, I don’t think that what you say about “both sets of norms useful” is implausible. (I do not, after all, take exception to all of your preferred norms—quite the contrary! Most of them are good. And an argument can be made that even the ones to which I object have their place. Such an argument would have to actually be made, and convincingly, for me to believe it—but that it could be made, seems to me not to be entirely out of the question.)
I’d say it casts mild doubt on the thesis, at best, and that the most likely resolution is that Ray ends up feeling something like “yeah, fair, this did not turn out to be the best example,” not “oh snap, you’re right, turns out it was all a house of cards.”
Well, as I’ve written, to the extent that the convincingness of an argument for some claim rests on examples (especially if it’s just one example), the purported example(s) turning out to be no such thing does, indeed, undermine the whole argument. (Especially—as I note above—insofar as that outcome also casts doubt on whatever process resulted in us believing that raven to have been white in the first place.)
Yeah I do find that comment/concept important. I think I basically already counting that class of thing in the list of positive things I’d mentioned elsethread, but yes, I am grateful to you for that. (Benquo being one to say it in that context is a bit more evidence of it’s weight which I had missed before, but I do think I was already weighting the concept approximately the right amount for the right reasons. Partly from having already generally updated on some parts of the Benquo worldview)
Please note, my point in linking that comment wasn’t to suggest that the things Benquo wrote are necessarily true and that the purported truth of those assertions, in itself, bears on the current situation. (Certainly I do agree with what he wrote—but then, I would, wouldn’t I?)
Rather, I was making a meta-level point. Namely: your thesis is that there is some behavior on my part which is bad, and that what makes it bad is that it makes post authors feel… bad in some way (“attacked”? “annoyed”? “discouraged”? I couldn’t say what the right adjective is, here), and that as a consequence, they stop posting on Less Wrong. And as the primary example of this purported bad behavior, you linked the discussion in the comments of the “Zetetic Explanation” post by Benquo (which resulted in the mod warning you noted).
But the comment which I linked has Benquo writing, mere months afterward, that the sort of critique/objection/commentary which I write (including the sort which I wrote in response to his aforesaid post) is “helpful and important”, “very important to the success of an epistemic community”, etc. (Which, I must note, is tremendously to Benquo’s credit. I have the greatest respect for anyone who can view, and treat, their sometime critics in such a fair-minded way.)
This seems like very much the opposite of leaving Less Wrong as a result of my commenting style.
It seems to me that when the prime example you provide of my participation in discussions on Less Wrong purportedly being the sort of thing that drive authors away, actually turns out to be an example of exactly the opposite—of an author (whose post I criticized, in somewhat harsh terms) fairly soon (months) thereafter saying that my critical comments are good and important to the community and that I should continue…
… well, then regardless of whether you agree with the author in question about whether or not my comments are good/important/whatever, the fact that he holds this view casts very serious doubt on your thesis. Wouldn’t you agree?
(And this, note, is an author who has written many posts, many of them quite highly upvoted, and whose writings I have often seen cited in all sorts of significant discussions, i.e., one who has contributed substantially to Less Wrong.)
The reason it’s not additional evidence to me is that I, too, find value in the comments you write for the reasons Benquo states, despite also finding them annoying at the time. So, Benquo’s response here seems like an additional instance of my viewpoint here, rather than a counterexample. (though I’m not claiming Benquo agrees with me on everything on this domain)
Said is asking Ray, not me, but I strongly disagree.
Point 1 is that a black raven is not strong evidence against white ravens. (Said knows this, I think.)
Point 2 is that a behavior which displeases many authors can still be pleasant or valuable to some authors. (Said knows this, I think.)
Point 3 is that benquo’s view on even that specific comment is not the only author-view that matters; benquo eventually being like “this critical feedback was great” does not mean that other authors watching the interaction at the time did not feel “ugh, I sure don’t want to write a post and have to deal with comments like this one.” (Said knows this, I think.)
(Notably, benquo once publicly stated that he suspected a rough interaction would likely have gone much better under Duncan moderation norms specifically; if we’re updating on benquo’s endorsements then it comes out to “both sets of norms useful,” presumably for different things.)
I’d say it casts mild doubt on the thesis, at best, and that the most likely resolution is that Ray ends up feeling something like “yeah, fair, this did not turn out to be the best example,” not “oh snap, you’re right, turns out it was all a house of cards.”
(This will be my only comment in this chain, so as to avoid repeating past cycles.)
A black raven is, indeed, not strong evidence against white ravens. But that’s not quite the right analogy. The more accurate analogy would go somewhat like this:
Alice: White ravens exist!
Bob: Yeah? For real? Where, can I see?
Alice (looking around and then pointing): Right… there! That one!
Bob (peering at the bird in question): But… that raven is actually black? Like, it’s definitely black and not white at all.
Now not only is Bob (once again, as he was at the start) in the position of having exactly zero examples of white ravens (Alice’s one purported example having been revealed to be not an example at all), but—and perhaps even more importantly!—Bob has reason to doubt not only Alice’s possession of any examples of her claim (of white ravens existing), but her very ability to correctly perceive what color any given raven is.
Now if Alice says “Well, I’ve seen a lot of white ravens, though”, Bob might quite reasonably reply: “Have you, though? Really? Because you just said that that raven was white, and it is definitely, totally black.” What’s more, not only Bob but also Alice herself ought rightly to significantly downgrade her confidence in her belief in white ravens (by a degree commensurate with how big a role her own supposed observations of white ravens have played in forming that belief).
Just so. But, once again, we must make our analysis more specific and more precise in order for it to be useful. There are two points to make in response to this.
First is what I said above: the point is not just that the commenting style/approach in question is valuable to some authors (although even that, by itself, is surely important!), but that it turns out to be valuable specifically to the author who served as an—indeed, as the—example of said commenting style/approach being bad. This calls into question not just the thesis that said approach is bad in general, but also the weight of any purported evidence of the approach’s badness, which comes from the same source as the now-controverted claim that it was bad for that specific author.
Second is that not all authors are equal.
Suppose, for example, that dozens of well-respected and highly valued authors all turned out to condemn my commenting style and my contributions, while those who showed up to defend me were all cranks, trolls, and troublemakers. It would still be true, then, to say that “my comments are valuable to some authors but displease others”, but of course the views of the “some” would be, in any reasonable weighting, vastly and overwhelmingly outweighed by the views of the “others”.
But that, of course, is clearly not what’s happening. And the fact that Benquo is certainly not some crank or troll or troublemaker, but a justly respected and valued contributor, is therefore quite relevant.
First, for clarity, let me note that we are not talking (and Benquo was not talking) about a single specific comment, but many comments—indeed, an entire approach to commenting and forum participation. But that is a detail.
It’s true that Benquo’s own views on the matter aren’t the only relevant ones. But they surely are the most relevant. (Indeed, it’s hard to see how one could claim otherwise.)
And as far as “audience reactions” (so to speak) go, it seems to me that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Indeed, some authors (or potential authors) reading the interaction might have had the reaction you describe. But others could have had the opposite reaction. (And, judging by the comments in that discussion thread—as well as many other comments over the years—others in fact did have the opposite reaction, when reading that discussion and numerous others in which I’ve taken part.) What’s more, it is even possible (and, I think, not at all implausible) that some authors read Benquo’s months-later comment and thought “you know, he’s right”.
Well, as I said in the grandparent comment, updating on Benquo’s endorsement is exactly what I was not suggesting that we do. (Not that I am suggesting the opposite—not updating on his endorsement—either. I am only saying that this was not my intended meaning.)
Still, I don’t think that what you say about “both sets of norms useful” is implausible. (I do not, after all, take exception to all of your preferred norms—quite the contrary! Most of them are good. And an argument can be made that even the ones to which I object have their place. Such an argument would have to actually be made, and convincingly, for me to believe it—but that it could be made, seems to me not to be entirely out of the question.)
Well, as I’ve written, to the extent that the convincingness of an argument for some claim rests on examples (especially if it’s just one example), the purported example(s) turning out to be no such thing does, indeed, undermine the whole argument. (Especially—as I note above—insofar as that outcome also casts doubt on whatever process resulted in us believing that raven to have been white in the first place.)