I imagine it is possible to develop some ethical theory that could handle creatures capable of merging and splitting. One possibility might be to count “utility functions” instead of individuals. This, would, of course result in weird questions like if two people’s preferences stop counting when they merge and then count again when they split. But at least it would stop someone from giving themselves a moral right to everything by making enough ems of themself.
Again, this idea probably has problems that need to be worked out. I very much doubt than I could figure out all the ethical implications in one response when Kaj wasn’t able to in a huge paper. But I don’t think it’s an insurmountable problem.
I imagine it is possible to develop some ethical theory that could handle creatures capable of merging and splitting. One possibility might be to count “utility functions” instead of individuals. This, would, of course result in weird questions like if two people’s preferences stop counting when they merge and then count again when they split. But at least it would stop someone from giving themselves a moral right to everything by making enough ems of themself.
Again, this idea probably has problems that need to be worked out. I very much doubt than I could figure out all the ethical implications in one response when Kaj wasn’t able to in a huge paper. But I don’t think it’s an insurmountable problem.