I don’t think it’s correct that the structure described here fits militaries cross-culturally, except in name. In the US and most Western European military structures, the senior NCOs are the critical link. The degree of authority and autonomy given to senior NCOs in the west is fundamentally different from that in most other military structures. I can’t comment on this from personal experience, but every US military service member I’ve known who has served extensively alongside militaries outside the US, Canada, or Western Europe has commented on this, and they argue that this is what makes western units so dominant even in battle conditions where technological superiority is not the deciding factor. Senior NCOs carry institutional knowledge in military occupations that is lost to officers due to the latter’s typical requirement to serve in a wide variety of commands, and they’re the prime movers in both logistical and tactical planning up to a fairly large scale. Every officer I’ve known has commented on this fact as well.
Furthermore, every soldier is taught the basic principles of tactical planning and has it drummed in that anyone might have to become the leader when higher ranks are killed in battle.
Other militaries have a structure much more in line with what is described here, and tend to either fall apart completely without direct officer leadership, or to never even reach a semblance of battle-competency in cultures where officership is mainly a class-based phenomenon that doesn’t select for strong leaders.
Thank you. This strengthens the question: Why this weird, very separate, category of “officer”? Given that the agenty/non-agenty distinction is not real, why the arbitrary boundary? Why not just have a ladder?
Well, one answer may simply be that militaries are class-and-tradition-laden bureaucracies that are hostile to change. Certainly this has been the experience of the US when attempting to build a western-style NCO corps into the militaries of allied developing nations.
Another answer might be that it’s already possible in principle: somebody has probably already mentioned this, but one can go from a NCO role into an officer role; the traditional term for this is “mustang officer”.
Another answer might be division of labor: traditionally, western military officers are required to gain a lot of breadth in their careers, both through academic education and through assignment to different types of field commands, logistical positions, and political positions. This poses a (common) problem for officers who have a personality type that wants depth in one type of military occupation; that role is more traditionally a senior NCO role. It may be, however, that this type of division of labor produces the most effective fighting force; I don’t know.
I don’t think it’s correct that the structure described here fits militaries cross-culturally, except in name. In the US and most Western European military structures, the senior NCOs are the critical link. The degree of authority and autonomy given to senior NCOs in the west is fundamentally different from that in most other military structures. I can’t comment on this from personal experience, but every US military service member I’ve known who has served extensively alongside militaries outside the US, Canada, or Western Europe has commented on this, and they argue that this is what makes western units so dominant even in battle conditions where technological superiority is not the deciding factor. Senior NCOs carry institutional knowledge in military occupations that is lost to officers due to the latter’s typical requirement to serve in a wide variety of commands, and they’re the prime movers in both logistical and tactical planning up to a fairly large scale. Every officer I’ve known has commented on this fact as well.
Furthermore, every soldier is taught the basic principles of tactical planning and has it drummed in that anyone might have to become the leader when higher ranks are killed in battle.
Other militaries have a structure much more in line with what is described here, and tend to either fall apart completely without direct officer leadership, or to never even reach a semblance of battle-competency in cultures where officership is mainly a class-based phenomenon that doesn’t select for strong leaders.
Thank you. This strengthens the question: Why this weird, very separate, category of “officer”? Given that the agenty/non-agenty distinction is not real, why the arbitrary boundary? Why not just have a ladder?
Well, one answer may simply be that militaries are class-and-tradition-laden bureaucracies that are hostile to change. Certainly this has been the experience of the US when attempting to build a western-style NCO corps into the militaries of allied developing nations.
Another answer might be that it’s already possible in principle: somebody has probably already mentioned this, but one can go from a NCO role into an officer role; the traditional term for this is “mustang officer”.
Another answer might be division of labor: traditionally, western military officers are required to gain a lot of breadth in their careers, both through academic education and through assignment to different types of field commands, logistical positions, and political positions. This poses a (common) problem for officers who have a personality type that wants depth in one type of military occupation; that role is more traditionally a senior NCO role. It may be, however, that this type of division of labor produces the most effective fighting force; I don’t know.