Yeah, same; I think this term has experienced some semantic drift, which is confusing. I meant to refer to pre-verbal intuitions in general, not just ones accompanied by physical sensation.
Yes, I think there’s a distinction between the semantic content of “My intuition is that Design A is better than Design B” referring to the semantic content or how the intuition “caches out” in terms of decisions. This contrast with the felt sense, which always seems to refer to what the intuition is like “from the inside,” for example a sense of unease when looking at Design A, and rightness when looking at Design B.
I feel like using the word “intuition” can refer to both the latter and the former, whereas when I say “felt sense” it always refers to the latter.
I think that Gendlin thinks all pre-verbal intuitions are represented with physical sensations.
I don’t agree with him but still use the felt-sense language in these parts because rationalists seem to know what I’m talking about.
Yeah, same; I think this term has experienced some semantic drift, which is confusing. I meant to refer to pre-verbal intuitions in general, not just ones accompanied by physical sensation.
Also in particular—felt sense refers to the qualia related to intuitions, rather than the intuitions themselves.
(Unsure, but I’m suspicious that the distinction between these two things might not be clear).
Yes, I think there’s a distinction between the semantic content of “My intuition is that Design A is better than Design B” referring to the semantic content or how the intuition “caches out” in terms of decisions. This contrast with the felt sense, which always seems to refer to what the intuition is like “from the inside,” for example a sense of unease when looking at Design A, and rightness when looking at Design B.
I feel like using the word “intuition” can refer to both the latter and the former, whereas when I say “felt sense” it always refers to the latter.