I think Eliezer’s policy as expressed here is better.
And, looking at the context, not particularly relevant.
When they are not yet shown to be right downvoting is perfectly reasonable. Changing your votes retrospectively is not always correct.
Unless Eliezer believes the information available to AK is sufficient to justify being ‘Very Sure’ I do not believe Eliezer’s actual or expressed policy suggests reversing votes if he is lucky. In fact my comment about lottery mistakes is a massively understated reference to what he has written on the subject (if I recall correctly).
Not that I advocate deferring to Eliezer here. If he thinks you can’t be overconfident and right at the same time he is just plain wrong. This is one of the most prevalent human biases.
I believe Eliezer’s policy is to criticize people when they’re wrong. If they say something right for the wrong reason, wait; they’ll say something wrong soon enough.
A number of reviewers said they learned important lessons in rationality from the exercise, seeing the reasoning that got it right contrasted to the reasoning that got it wrong. Did you?
A number of reviewers said they learned important lessons in rationality from the exercise, seeing the reasoning that got it right contrasted to the reasoning that got it wrong. Did you?
What do you mean by ‘right’ here? Do you mean “made correct predictions about which decisions Eliezer would choose for Harry?” While exploring the solutions I am rather careful to keep evaluations of how practical, rational (and, I’ll admit, “how awesome”) a solution is completely distinct from predictions about which particular practical, rational and possibly awesome solution an author will choose. I tend to focus on the former far more because I hate guessing passwords.
I’ll respond again when I’ve had a chance to do more than skim the chapter and evaluate the reasoning properly.
I think Eliezer’s policy as expressed here is better.
And, looking at the context, not particularly relevant.
When they are not yet shown to be right downvoting is perfectly reasonable. Changing your votes retrospectively is not always correct.
Unless Eliezer believes the information available to AK is sufficient to justify being ‘Very Sure’ I do not believe Eliezer’s actual or expressed policy suggests reversing votes if he is lucky. In fact my comment about lottery mistakes is a massively understated reference to what he has written on the subject (if I recall correctly).
Not that I advocate deferring to Eliezer here. If he thinks you can’t be overconfident and right at the same time he is just plain wrong. This is one of the most prevalent human biases.
I believe Eliezer’s policy is to criticize people when they’re wrong. If they say something right for the wrong reason, wait; they’ll say something wrong soon enough.
A number of reviewers said they learned important lessons in rationality from the exercise, seeing the reasoning that got it right contrasted to the reasoning that got it wrong. Did you?
What do you mean by ‘right’ here? Do you mean “made correct predictions about which decisions Eliezer would choose for Harry?” While exploring the solutions I am rather careful to keep evaluations of how practical, rational (and, I’ll admit, “how awesome”) a solution is completely distinct from predictions about which particular practical, rational and possibly awesome solution an author will choose. I tend to focus on the former far more because I hate guessing passwords.
I’ll respond again when I’ve had a chance to do more than skim the chapter and evaluate the reasoning properly.