Haven’t read this one either, but if anyone does, I would be curious how far the analogy carries over: a lot of voting paradoxes are resolved with additional information. (For example, Arrow’s paradox is resolved with cardinal information.) If this is true, then whatever problem may be resolved with asymptotically more information—that an algorithm gives bad results with too little information is not very interesting.
I’m not convinced that Briggs’ argument succeeds but I take it that the argument is meant to apply as long as the theory ranks decisions ordinally (rather than applying only if they do so and not if they utilise more information). See my response to manfred for a few more minor details.
Haven’t read this one either, but if anyone does, I would be curious how far the analogy carries over: a lot of voting paradoxes are resolved with additional information. (For example, Arrow’s paradox is resolved with cardinal information.) If this is true, then whatever problem may be resolved with asymptotically more information—that an algorithm gives bad results with too little information is not very interesting.
I’m not convinced that Briggs’ argument succeeds but I take it that the argument is meant to apply as long as the theory ranks decisions ordinally (rather than applying only if they do so and not if they utilise more information). See my response to manfred for a few more minor details.