This isn’t true with Briggs’ argument—it can’t simply be resolved by having cardinal preferences.
Yup, I missed that a year ago.
evil-CDT
I’m not sure where I was going with that either.
Briggs is here primarily considering cases where your preferences don’t change as a result of your decision (but where your credences might).
True. Though on the other hand, the smoking lesion problem (and variants) is pretty much the credence-changing equivalent of doing meth :P I still think the requirements are akin to “let’s find a decision theory that does meth but never has anything bad happen to it.”
Yup, I missed that a year ago.
I’m not sure where I was going with that either.
True. Though on the other hand, the smoking lesion problem (and variants) is pretty much the credence-changing equivalent of doing meth :P I still think the requirements are akin to “let’s find a decision theory that does meth but never has anything bad happen to it.”