Choice B, on the grounds that a paperclipper is likely to prevent life as we know it from rising again through whatever mechanism it rose the first time.
For the slightly different case in which life both dies and is guaranteed not to rise naturally ever again, choice A. There’s a small but finite chance of the paperclipper slipping enough bits to produce something worthwhile, like life. This is probably less likely than whatever jumpstarted life on Earth happening again.
For the again slightly different case in which life dies and is guaranteed not to rise again through any means including the actions of the paperclipper, back to choice B. There are cool things in the universe that would be made less cool by turning them into paperclips.
For the slightly different case in which life both dies and is guaranteed not to rise naturally ever again, choice A. There’s a small but finite chance of the paperclipper slipping enough bits to produce something worthwhile, like life. This is probably less likely than whatever jumpstarted life on Earth happening again.
If I were a paper-clipper and wanted to maximize paper clip output, it would make sense to have some form of self replicating paper-clip manufacture units.
Well, yeah, but one doesn’t necessarily value those. I mean, there’s no difference between a paperclipper and a super-bacteria that will never change and perpetually creates copies of itself out of the entire universe. Life is usually considered worthwhile because of the diversity and the possibility of evolving to something resembling “persons”, not just because it reproduces.
There’s a small but finite chance of the paperclipper slipping enough bits to produce something worthwhile, like life.
Within a system of self-replicating information...maybe, just maybe, you’ll start getting little selfish bits that are more concerned with replicating themselves than they are with making paperclips. It all starts from there.
Assuming, of course, that the greater part of the paperclipper doesn’t just find a way to crush these lesser selfish pieces. They’re basically cancer.
Oh, OK then. On this site I usually understand “paperclipper” to mean “something that will transform all the universe into paperclips unless stopped by someone smarter than it”, not just “something really good at making paperclips without supervision”. Someone please hit me with a clue stick if I’ve been totally wrong about that.
I hadn’t considered the possibility of a paperclipper being able to do anything that could keep life from restarting from scratch. (Which is probably just one of many reasons I shouldn’t be an AI gatekeeper...)
Re your third point; once there are no longer any sapient beings left in the universe in which to judge the coolness of anything, do you feel it really matters whether or not they continue to exist? That is, do you feel that objects have some sort of objective measure of coolness which is worthwhile to preserve even in the absence of any subjective viewpoints to make coolness evaluations?
That is, do you feel that objects have some sort of objective measure of coolness which is worthwhile to preserve even in the absence of any subjective viewpoints to make coolness evaluations?
Do you care intrinsically about anything which isn’t a mind? This seems to be something that would vary individually.
It’s an interesting question; so far, the closest I have to an answer is that any timeline which doesn’t have minds within it to do any caring, seems to be to not be worth caring about. Which leads to the answer to your question of ‘nope’.
Choice B, on the grounds that a paperclipper is likely to prevent life as we know it from rising again through whatever mechanism it rose the first time.
For the slightly different case in which life both dies and is guaranteed not to rise naturally ever again, choice A. There’s a small but finite chance of the paperclipper slipping enough bits to produce something worthwhile, like life. This is probably less likely than whatever jumpstarted life on Earth happening again.
For the again slightly different case in which life dies and is guaranteed not to rise again through any means including the actions of the paperclipper, back to choice B. There are cool things in the universe that would be made less cool by turning them into paperclips.
If I were a paper-clipper and wanted to maximize paper clip output, it would make sense to have some form of self replicating paper-clip manufacture units.
Well, yeah, but one doesn’t necessarily value those. I mean, there’s no difference between a paperclipper and a super-bacteria that will never change and perpetually creates copies of itself out of the entire universe. Life is usually considered worthwhile because of the diversity and the possibility of evolving to something resembling “persons”, not just because it reproduces.
True. What I said was in reference to
Within a system of self-replicating information...maybe, just maybe, you’ll start getting little selfish bits that are more concerned with replicating themselves than they are with making paperclips. It all starts from there.
Assuming, of course, that the greater part of the paperclipper doesn’t just find a way to crush these lesser selfish pieces. They’re basically cancer.
Oh, OK then. On this site I usually understand “paperclipper” to mean “something that will transform all the universe into paperclips unless stopped by someone smarter than it”, not just “something really good at making paperclips without supervision”. Someone please hit me with a clue stick if I’ve been totally wrong about that.
You’ve gotten it right this time.
So you think that majestic paperclip engineering cannot be cool? (Only regarding your last paragraph.)
I hadn’t considered the possibility of a paperclipper being able to do anything that could keep life from restarting from scratch. (Which is probably just one of many reasons I shouldn’t be an AI gatekeeper...)
Re your third point; once there are no longer any sapient beings left in the universe in which to judge the coolness of anything, do you feel it really matters whether or not they continue to exist? That is, do you feel that objects have some sort of objective measure of coolness which is worthwhile to preserve even in the absence of any subjective viewpoints to make coolness evaluations?
Do you care intrinsically about anything which isn’t a mind? This seems to be something that would vary individually.
It’s an interesting question; so far, the closest I have to an answer is that any timeline which doesn’t have minds within it to do any caring, seems to be to not be worth caring about. Which leads to the answer to your question of ‘nope’.