Are there any moral implications of accepting the Many Worlds interpretation, and if so what could they be?
For example, if the divergent copies of people (including myself) in other branches of Multiverse should be given non-insignificant moral status, then it’s one more argument against the Epicurean principle that “as long as we exist, death is not here”. My many-worlds self can die partially—that is, just in some of the worlds. So I should to reduce the number of worlds in which I’m dead. On the other hand, does it really change anything compared to “I should reduce the probability that I’m dead in this world”?
Nope, not really. With no math, the thing is, the different “branches” take up a fraction of the world. Classically you might say “If eating cake is 2 units of utility and not eating cake is 0 units, then a 50% chance of cake is 1 unit.” Quantum mechanically, you’d say “If eating cake is 2 units of utility and not eating cake is 0 units, then 50% of my current measure going to eating cake is 1 unit.”
I really, really hate the ‘many worlds’ idea, and I hope it’s not true. All those almost-me’s in all those worlds –what are they doing? Some of them may be great people, but lots of them are bound to be much worse than me. Every time my flipping imagination comes up with something horrible I could do, does some other Berna in some other world really do it? No, no, no, no – I really, really don’t want to even think about that.
If they diverged recently, they’re just you under different circumstances. As the point of divergence recedes into the past, the less you should call them ‘you’. To the extent that they differ from you, they’re different people. You might as well complain that other people are better or worse than you.
Are there any moral implications of accepting the Many Worlds interpretation, and if so what could they be?
For example, if the divergent copies of people (including myself) in other branches of Multiverse should be given non-insignificant moral status, then it’s one more argument against the Epicurean principle that “as long as we exist, death is not here”. My many-worlds self can die partially—that is, just in some of the worlds. So I should to reduce the number of worlds in which I’m dead. On the other hand, does it really change anything compared to “I should reduce the probability that I’m dead in this world”?
Nope, not really. With no math, the thing is, the different “branches” take up a fraction of the world. Classically you might say “If eating cake is 2 units of utility and not eating cake is 0 units, then a 50% chance of cake is 1 unit.” Quantum mechanically, you’d say “If eating cake is 2 units of utility and not eating cake is 0 units, then 50% of my current measure going to eating cake is 1 unit.”
See Egan’s Law.
I really, really hate the ‘many worlds’ idea, and I hope it’s not true. All those almost-me’s in all those worlds –what are they doing? Some of them may be great people, but lots of them are bound to be much worse than me. Every time my flipping imagination comes up with something horrible I could do, does some other Berna in some other world really do it? No, no, no, no – I really, really don’t want to even think about that.
If they diverged recently, they’re just you under different circumstances. As the point of divergence recedes into the past, the less you should call them ‘you’. To the extent that they differ from you, they’re different people. You might as well complain that other people are better or worse than you.
Thank you! You’re right, of course, and that does make me feel better.
Huge. If you’ve ever felt the teansiest bit like killing someone, youre a murderer somewhere. Enjoy!