Vaniver was saying that causality is entirely high level.
Maybe. But Yudkowsky sometimes writes as though it is fundamental.
That cannot be the case, though, because it means that causality itself is caused by the low level, which is a contradiction.
It would mean causality is constituted by the low level. Nowadays, causation means efficient causation, not material causation.
This cannot be reduced to something else, because the thing it was supposedly reduced to would be what causality is from, and would help to explain it, leading to a contradiction.
As before …efficient causation is narrower than anything that can explain anything.
I agree, it would not be a contradiction to think that you could explain efficient causality using material causality (although you still might be wrong.) But you could not explain material causality in the same way.
Maybe. But Yudkowsky sometimes writes as though it is fundamental.
It would mean causality is constituted by the low level. Nowadays, causation means efficient causation, not material causation.
As before …efficient causation is narrower than anything that can explain anything.
I agree, it would not be a contradiction to think that you could explain efficient causality using material causality (although you still might be wrong.) But you could not explain material causality in the same way.