I’m not totally sure what the argument means myself. Here’s the situation as I see it. We have an intuition that “right” might be something important but we’re not sure what it is, so we want to ask “what does right mean?” Eliezer claimed to have dissolved this question, so we can stop thinking about it and move on. But I keep having the suspicion that the dissolution doesn’t quite work. This argument is an attempt to explain why I have this suspicion.
Does your argument also work for paperclippers or prime-pebblesorters?
If they don’t use words like “moral”, “right”, and “should” to think about what to do, but just runs an algorithm that makes decisions without using such words, then no, my argument has nothing to do with them.
Pebblesorters use words whose meaning feels mysterious to them, but the computation that encodes their preferences doesn’t need to use any such words, it just counts pebbles in heaps. This shoots down your argument.
Tangentially: the first time I read this comment I parsed the first word as “Philosophers.” Which rendered the comment puzzling, but not necessarily wrong.
It is not entirely clear to me that Pebblesorters are good standins for humans in this sort of analogy.
But, leaving that aside… applying Wei Dai’s argument to Pebblesorters involves asking whether Idealized Pebblesorters use words like “right” and “should” and “good” and “correct” and “proper” with respect to prime-numbered piles, the way Base Pebblesorters do.
I’m not sure what the answer to that question is. It seems to me that they just confuse themselves by doing so, but I feel that way about humans too.
You’re certainly right that the computation that encodes their preferences doesn’t involve words, but I don’t know what that has to do with anything. The computation that encodes our preferences doesn’t involve words either… and so?
The further along this track I go, the less meaningful the question seems. I guess I’m Just Not Getting It.
I’m not totally sure what the argument means myself. Here’s the situation as I see it. We have an intuition that “right” might be something important but we’re not sure what it is, so we want to ask “what does right mean?” Eliezer claimed to have dissolved this question, so we can stop thinking about it and move on. But I keep having the suspicion that the dissolution doesn’t quite work. This argument is an attempt to explain why I have this suspicion.
If they don’t use words like “moral”, “right”, and “should” to think about what to do, but just runs an algorithm that makes decisions without using such words, then no, my argument has nothing to do with them.
Pebblesorters use words whose meaning feels mysterious to them, but the computation that encodes their preferences doesn’t need to use any such words, it just counts pebbles in heaps. This shoots down your argument.
Tangentially: the first time I read this comment I parsed the first word as “Philosophers.” Which rendered the comment puzzling, but not necessarily wrong.
It is not entirely clear to me that Pebblesorters are good standins for humans in this sort of analogy.
But, leaving that aside… applying Wei Dai’s argument to Pebblesorters involves asking whether Idealized Pebblesorters use words like “right” and “should” and “good” and “correct” and “proper” with respect to prime-numbered piles, the way Base Pebblesorters do.
I’m not sure what the answer to that question is. It seems to me that they just confuse themselves by doing so, but I feel that way about humans too.
You’re certainly right that the computation that encodes their preferences doesn’t involve words, but I don’t know what that has to do with anything. The computation that encodes our preferences doesn’t involve words either… and so?
The further along this track I go, the less meaningful the question seems. I guess I’m Just Not Getting It.