Sure, I’m certainly not saying that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, and my understanding is that a decoherence view is both more useful and simpler. MWI (at least as I understand it) is a significantly stronger claim. When we take the probabilities that come from wave state amplitudes as observed frequencies among actually existing “worlds” then we are claiming that there are many different versions of me that actually exist. It’s this last part that I find a bit of a stretch.
If many different versions of you existing bothers you, does Schroedinger’s cat bother you?
The extent to which MWI is a stronger claim than “no collapse,” it’s purely interpretative. It certainly doesn’t posit any “splitting” beyond vanilla QM. Questions about conservation of energy suggest that you don’t get this.
Sure, I’m certainly not saying that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, and my understanding is that a decoherence view is both more useful and simpler. MWI (at least as I understand it) is a significantly stronger claim. When we take the probabilities that come from wave state amplitudes as observed frequencies among actually existing “worlds” then we are claiming that there are many different versions of me that actually exist. It’s this last part that I find a bit of a stretch.
If many different versions of you existing bothers you, does Schroedinger’s cat bother you?
The extent to which MWI is a stronger claim than “no collapse,” it’s purely interpretative. It certainly doesn’t posit any “splitting” beyond vanilla QM. Questions about conservation of energy suggest that you don’t get this.