If I were to attempt to characterize consciousness in computational terms, I would probably start with a diagram like that for the Mealy machine in this pdf. I would label the top box simply “computation” and the lower box “short term memory. I would speculate that consciousness has something to do with that feedback loop through short term memory. I might even go so far as to claim that the information flowing through short term memory constitutes the “stream of consciousness”.
If this approach is taken, there are some consequences. One is a kind of anti-anti-zombie principle. You simply cannot characterize consciousness by looking at the I/O function from inputs X to outputs Z. It is at least conceivable that the same I/O function might be implemented using a completely different feedback trace—one which encoded the information Y differently is one possibility. Another possible change might be to use something other than “short term memory” to buffer the feedback.
A second consequence is that if you want to capture consciousness on tape, you probably need to capture Y rather than Z. A third consequence is that the “seat of consciousness” is either in the computational machinery, in the short term memory, or (my intuition) in both, together with the communication paths that tie them together.
If I were to attempt to characterize consciousness in computational terms, I would probably start with a diagram like that for the Mealy machine in this pdf. I would label the top box simply “computation” and the lower box “short term memory. I would speculate that consciousness has something to do with that feedback loop through short term memory. I might even go so far as to claim that the information flowing through short term memory constitutes the “stream of consciousness”.
If this approach is taken, there are some consequences. One is a kind of anti-anti-zombie principle. You simply cannot characterize consciousness by looking at the I/O function from inputs X to outputs Z. It is at least conceivable that the same I/O function might be implemented using a completely different feedback trace—one which encoded the information Y differently is one possibility. Another possible change might be to use something other than “short term memory” to buffer the feedback.
A second consequence is that if you want to capture consciousness on tape, you probably need to capture Y rather than Z. A third consequence is that the “seat of consciousness” is either in the computational machinery, in the short term memory, or (my intuition) in both, together with the communication paths that tie them together.