What is an example of a case you’ve actually observed where MWI made a falsifiable, bold, successful prediction? (“Falsifiable”—say what would have made the prediction fail. “Bold”—explain what a CI guy or random good human physicist would have falsifiably predicted differently.)
The call for such an actual prediction was based on the claim that
These predictions frequently do not overlap with what existing cognitive science would have one expect.
There is not necessarily a need for differing predictions to choose one explanation over another, which is why MWI isn’t an analogous comparison. When two competing descriptions predict the exact same, you’d choose the simpler one, based on Occam’s Razor.
Connection Theory, prima facie from the OP, introduces additional assumptions (additional complexity). As such, even if it reliably made the exact same predictions as previous models, it would be rejected on that additional complexity alone. Thus, CT needs to provide different and better fitting explanations than the hitherto standard, since on complexity grounds it cannot compete, unlike (purportedly) MWI.
From what I understand, the analogy between CT and MWI is strikingly good. According to Leverage Research, “Connection Theory is composed of five core claims” and it has “two most important claims”. This is far fewer than the multitude of ad hoc models used in the standard cognitive science, so Occam FTW. And the predictions are apparently all the same, so, if CT was thought of first, it, according to EY, would have been the preferred model.
From what I understand, the analogy between CT and MWI is strikingly good. According to Leverage Research, “Connection Theory is composed of five core claims” and it has “two most important claims”. This is far fewer than the multitude of ad hoc models used in the standard cognitive science, so Occam FTW. And the predictions are apparently all the same, so, if CT was thought of first, it, according to EY, would have been the preferred model.
You evidently have a very different understanding of “Occam’s Razor” to Eliezer.
Can’t resist...
What is an example of a case you’ve actually observed where MWI made a falsifiable, bold, successful prediction? (“Falsifiable”—say what would have made the prediction fail. “Bold”—explain what a CI guy or random good human physicist would have falsifiably predicted differently.)
The call for such an actual prediction was based on the claim that
There is not necessarily a need for differing predictions to choose one explanation over another, which is why MWI isn’t an analogous comparison. When two competing descriptions predict the exact same, you’d choose the simpler one, based on Occam’s Razor.
Connection Theory, prima facie from the OP, introduces additional assumptions (additional complexity). As such, even if it reliably made the exact same predictions as previous models, it would be rejected on that additional complexity alone. Thus, CT needs to provide different and better fitting explanations than the hitherto standard, since on complexity grounds it cannot compete, unlike (purportedly) MWI.
From what I understand, the analogy between CT and MWI is strikingly good. According to Leverage Research, “Connection Theory is composed of five core claims” and it has “two most important claims”. This is far fewer than the multitude of ad hoc models used in the standard cognitive science, so Occam FTW. And the predictions are apparently all the same, so, if CT was thought of first, it, according to EY, would have been the preferred model.
You evidently have a very different understanding of “Occam’s Razor” to Eliezer.