I think this is pushing the argument too much. I’m sure you see his point that physics is different than philosophy.
The claim was that it would be “absurd” if a professor of physics admitted that his opinion regarding a “problem” would be different if he attended a different school.
I fail to see what would be absurd about it. I take the word “problem” here to mean something that doesn’t have a settled answer in the field, so I had to reach as far out as string theory to find something accessible to the non-physicist. I honestly don’t see in what relevant way physics is different from philosophy here. I likely would’ve had the same reaction regarding any academic field.
I agree with your point: something doesn’t become a “problem” in physics unless it’s so hard to find observational evidence that favors one view over another that it can’t be quickly resolved.. So the remaining things left that count as problems are the very ones where different experts can reasonably hold different views, and one will see a stronger case in schools that support a particular view.
On the opposite end, problems in philosophy that actually get solved are then spun off into other fields and so no longer count as philosophy. What we now call “physics” was at one time “natural philosophy”.
Still, I think there’s a difference in that philosophy hasn’t been spinning off productive scientific research programs in the past few decades. But don’t think that was Daniel_Burfoot’s point.
I see, the fallacy was mine: the typical mind fallacy. I thought of ‘problem’ as something that—in physics—would be already solved and straightforward.
The claim was that it would be “absurd” if a professor of physics admitted that his opinion regarding a “problem” would be different if he attended a different school.
I fail to see what would be absurd about it. I take the word “problem” here to mean something that doesn’t have a settled answer in the field, so I had to reach as far out as string theory to find something accessible to the non-physicist. I honestly don’t see in what relevant way physics is different from philosophy here. I likely would’ve had the same reaction regarding any academic field.
I agree with your point: something doesn’t become a “problem” in physics unless it’s so hard to find observational evidence that favors one view over another that it can’t be quickly resolved.. So the remaining things left that count as problems are the very ones where different experts can reasonably hold different views, and one will see a stronger case in schools that support a particular view.
On the opposite end, problems in philosophy that actually get solved are then spun off into other fields and so no longer count as philosophy. What we now call “physics” was at one time “natural philosophy”.
Still, I think there’s a difference in that philosophy hasn’t been spinning off productive scientific research programs in the past few decades. But don’t think that was Daniel_Burfoot’s point.
I see, the fallacy was mine: the typical mind fallacy. I thought of ‘problem’ as something that—in physics—would be already solved and straightforward.