Well, they might be just as internally consistent (in some weak, subjective, sense). But if this kind of internal consistency or ratification suffices for justification, then there’s no “epistemic luck” involved after all. Both believers might know full well that their own views are self-endorsing.
I was instead thinking that self-ratifying principles were necessary for full justification. On top of that, it may just be a brute epistemic fact which of (say) occamism and anti-occamism is really justified. Then two people might have formally similar beliefs, and each sticks to their own guns in light of the other’s disagreement (which they view as a product of the other’s epistemic stunting), and yet only one of the two is actually right (justified) to do so. But that’s because only one of the two views was really justifiable in the first place: the actual disagreement may play no (or little) essential role, on this way of looking at things.
Well, they might be just as internally consistent (in some weak, subjective, sense). But if this kind of internal consistency or ratification suffices for justification, then there’s no “epistemic luck” involved after all. Both believers might know full well that their own views are self-endorsing.
I was instead thinking that self-ratifying principles were necessary for full justification. On top of that, it may just be a brute epistemic fact which of (say) occamism and anti-occamism is really justified. Then two people might have formally similar beliefs, and each sticks to their own guns in light of the other’s disagreement (which they view as a product of the other’s epistemic stunting), and yet only one of the two is actually right (justified) to do so. But that’s because only one of the two views was really justifiable in the first place: the actual disagreement may play no (or little) essential role, on this way of looking at things.
For further background, see my discussion of Personal Bias and Peer Disagreement.