Good points. I think the term moral realism is probably used in a variety of ways in the public sphere. I think the relevant sense is “will alignment solve itself because a smart machine will decide to behave in a way we like”. If there’s some vague sense of stuff everyone “should” do, but it doesn’t make them actually do it, then it doesn’t matter for this purpose.
I was (and have been) making a theory about definitions.
I think “the good is what you should do” is remarkably devoid of useful meaning. People often mean very little by “should”, are unclear both to others and themselves, and use it in different ways in different situations.
My theory is that “good” is usually defined as an emotion, not another set of words, and that emotion roughly means “I want that person on my team” (when applied to behavior), because evolution engineered us to find useful teammates, and that feeling is its mechanism for doing so.
Good points. I think the term moral realism is probably used in a variety of ways in the public sphere. I think the relevant sense is “will alignment solve itself because a smart machine will decide to behave in a way we like”. If there’s some vague sense of stuff everyone “should” do, but it doesn’t make them actually do it, then it doesn’t matter for this purpose.
I think “the good is what you should do” is remarkably devoid of useful meaning. People often mean very little by “should”, are unclear both to others and themselves, and use it in different ways in different situations.
For understanding human ethics, the important thing is that it grounds out in punishments and rewards—the good is what you should do , and if you don’t do it, you face punishment. Another thing that means is that a theory of ethics must be sufficient to justify putting people in jail. But a definition is not a theory.
My theory is that “good” is usually defined as an emotion, not another set of words, and that emotion roughly means “I want that person on my team” (when applied to behavior),
If your whole theory of ethics is to rubber stamp emotions or opinions, you end up with a very superficial theory that is open to objections like the Open Question argument. Just because somebody feels it is good to do X does not mean it was necessarily is—it is an open question. If the good is your emotions , then it is a closed question...your emotions are your emotions , likewise your values are your values, and your opinions are your opinions. The openness of the question “you feel that X is good, but is it really?” is a *theoretical” reason for believing that “goodness” works more like “truth” and less like “belief”.
(And the OQA is quite likely what this passage by Nostalgebraist hints at:-
*Who shoots down the enemy soldiers while thinking, “if I had been born there, it would have been all-important for their side to win, and so I would have shot at the men on this side. However, I was born in my country, not theirs, and so it is all-important that my country should win, and that theirs should lose.
There is no reason for this. It could have been the other way around, and everything would be left exactly the same, except for the ‘values.’
I cannot argue with the enemy, for there is no argument in my favor. I can only shoot them down.)
because evolution engineered us to find useful teammates, and that feeling is its mechanism for
And having gathered our team to fight the other team, we can ask ourselves whether we might actually be the baddies.
The *practical* objection kicks in when there are conflicts between subjective views.
A theory of ethics needs to justify real world actions—especially actions that impact other people , especially actions that impact other people negatively.( It’s not just about passively understanding the world, about ‘what anticipated experiences come about from the belief that something is “good” or “bad”?’)Why should someone really go to jail ,if they havent really done anything wrong? Well, if the good is what you should do, jailing people is justifiable , because the kind of ting you shouldn’t do is the kind of thing you deserve punishment for.
Of course, the open question argument doesn’t take you all the way to full strength moral realism. Less obviously, there are many alternatives to MR. Nihilism is one: you can’t argue that emotivism is true because MR is false—emotivism might be wrong because ethics is nothing. Emotivism might also be wrong because some position weaker than MR is right.
Good points. I think the term moral realism is probably used in a variety of ways in the public sphere. I think the relevant sense is “will alignment solve itself because a smart machine will decide to behave in a way we like”. If there’s some vague sense of stuff everyone “should” do, but it doesn’t make them actually do it, then it doesn’t matter for this purpose.
I was (and have been) making a theory about definitions.
I think “the good is what you should do” is remarkably devoid of useful meaning. People often mean very little by “should”, are unclear both to others and themselves, and use it in different ways in different situations.
My theory is that “good” is usually defined as an emotion, not another set of words, and that emotion roughly means “I want that person on my team” (when applied to behavior), because evolution engineered us to find useful teammates, and that feeling is its mechanism for doing so.
For understanding human ethics, the important thing is that it grounds out in punishments and rewards—the good is what you should do , and if you don’t do it, you face punishment. Another thing that means is that a theory of ethics must be sufficient to justify putting people in jail. But a definition is not a theory.
If your whole theory of ethics is to rubber stamp emotions or opinions, you end up with a very superficial theory that is open to objections like the Open Question argument. Just because somebody feels it is good to do X does not mean it was necessarily is—it is an open question. If the good is your emotions , then it is a closed question...your emotions are your emotions , likewise your values are your values, and your opinions are your opinions. The openness of the question “you feel that X is good, but is it really?” is a *theoretical” reason for believing that “goodness” works more like “truth” and less like “belief”.
(And the OQA is quite likely what this passage by Nostalgebraist hints at:-
*Who shoots down the enemy soldiers while thinking, “if I had been born there, it would have been all-important for their side to win, and so I would have shot at the men on this side. However, I was born in my country, not theirs, and so it is all-important that my country should win, and that theirs should lose.
There is no reason for this. It could have been the other way around, and everything would be left exactly the same, except for the ‘values.’
I cannot argue with the enemy, for there is no argument in my favor. I can only shoot them down.)
And having gathered our team to fight the other team, we can ask ourselves whether we might actually be the baddies.
The *practical* objection kicks in when there are conflicts between subjective views.
A theory of ethics needs to justify real world actions—especially actions that impact other people , especially actions that impact other people negatively.( It’s not just about passively understanding the world, about ‘what anticipated experiences come about from the belief that something is “good” or “bad”?’)Why should someone really go to jail ,if they havent really done anything wrong? Well, if the good is what you should do, jailing people is justifiable , because the kind of ting you shouldn’t do is the kind of thing you deserve punishment for.
Of course, the open question argument doesn’t take you all the way to full strength moral realism. Less obviously, there are many alternatives to MR. Nihilism is one: you can’t argue that emotivism is true because MR is false—emotivism might be wrong because ethics is nothing. Emotivism might also be wrong because some position weaker than MR is right.