Even when talking to yourself, the rest of his point holds- there is nothing magical about the label “rationality” that you’re gonna find in the territory- it’s just part of how you mark up your map.
That said, I don’t actually seem to think in English (or any other interhuman language) all that much unless I’m planning out what to say (or what I want to say). This is something that I’ve only noticed fairly recently, and it seems to be something that most people don’t realize.
Talking to yourself when planning what to say certainly counts as “for communication between two people”.
Yes, the rest of Eliezer’s point holds; that would be why I didn’t criticize the rest of Eliezer’s point.
Different people think in words to different extents. (And for some of what seems like thinking in words, perhaps the word-generation is more or less epiphenomenal—though I’d expect it always has some value, e.g. in helping the short-term memory along.) I find that I use words in the same sort of way as I use diagrams or mathematical symbols: as a way to avoid losing track of what I’m thinking, and to enable some degree of rigour when it’s needed.
Yes, there are situations when talking to yourself can usefully be considered “communication between two people”, but those aren’t the situations I had in mind.
There are only two ways for the mind to consciously process information—language or images. There are some people who can apparently think clearly and precisely in images—Nikola Tesla and Temple Grandin spring immediately to mind. Language is the only way other than visual images to think consciously and precisely. For this purpose mathematics is a language.
You mean composers can’t think consciously and precisely about sound? Chefs about taste? Perfumers (sp?) about smell? Gymnasts about the feel of their moves?
They generally don’t—at least, not in ways that they can communicate to others, and if they can’t do that, why would we describe their thoughts as ‘conscious’ and ‘precise’?
I don’t see how “communicate to others” and “conscious/precise” are related. If something is unconscious, it can still be communicated unconsciously (e.g. body language). If something is imprecise, that doesn’t stop it from being communicated. Conversely, just because something is conscious or precise doesn’t mean it can be communicated, if there are no points of reference on the receiving end. If a chef or a gymnast tried to communicate with me about such matters, they would probably fail, but that doesn’t mean the failure was on their end of the conversation -- and would have nothing to do with the consciousness or precision of the thoughts involved.
Even when talking to yourself, the rest of his point holds- there is nothing magical about the label “rationality” that you’re gonna find in the territory- it’s just part of how you mark up your map.
That said, I don’t actually seem to think in English (or any other interhuman language) all that much unless I’m planning out what to say (or what I want to say). This is something that I’ve only noticed fairly recently, and it seems to be something that most people don’t realize.
Talking to yourself when planning what to say certainly counts as “for communication between two people”.
Yes, the rest of Eliezer’s point holds; that would be why I didn’t criticize the rest of Eliezer’s point.
Different people think in words to different extents. (And for some of what seems like thinking in words, perhaps the word-generation is more or less epiphenomenal—though I’d expect it always has some value, e.g. in helping the short-term memory along.) I find that I use words in the same sort of way as I use diagrams or mathematical symbols: as a way to avoid losing track of what I’m thinking, and to enable some degree of rigour when it’s needed.
Yes, there are situations when talking to yourself can usefully be considered “communication between two people”, but those aren’t the situations I had in mind.
There are only two ways for the mind to consciously process information—language or images. There are some people who can apparently think clearly and precisely in images—Nikola Tesla and Temple Grandin spring immediately to mind. Language is the only way other than visual images to think consciously and precisely. For this purpose mathematics is a language.
You mean composers can’t think consciously and precisely about sound? Chefs about taste? Perfumers (sp?) about smell? Gymnasts about the feel of their moves?
They generally don’t—at least, not in ways that they can communicate to others, and if they can’t do that, why would we describe their thoughts as ‘conscious’ and ‘precise’?
I don’t see how “communicate to others” and “conscious/precise” are related. If something is unconscious, it can still be communicated unconsciously (e.g. body language). If something is imprecise, that doesn’t stop it from being communicated. Conversely, just because something is conscious or precise doesn’t mean it can be communicated, if there are no points of reference on the receiving end. If a chef or a gymnast tried to communicate with me about such matters, they would probably fail, but that doesn’t mean the failure was on their end of the conversation -- and would have nothing to do with the consciousness or precision of the thoughts involved.