The fitness maximising calculations are encoded, by evolution, in the neural patterns relating to the cuteness response. The individuals whose cuteness response correlates with fitness are themselves more fit. Those who would give more food to their malformed three-legged offspring will go extinct. So of course the mother is doing fitness calculations. It doesn’t feel like that from the inside, but that doesn’t make it any less true.
No she is not. Except in the sense that she is perhaps one small step in something that does fitness calculations, but looking at her brain you wouldn’t find fitness maximization calculations being done just execution of old adaptations.
And the religions people who merely believe that they believe in their god, they feel very religions from the inside.
Religious people believe they believe in God. And many of them are correct on this.
There is a distinction to be made between the internal state of they who argue violence against a certain group is a good thing, but don’t lift a finger themselves (BELIEF1) , and, they who upon being convinced that violence against this group is a good thing, actually attack said group (BELIEF2). It is that distinction that I mean when I say they don’t really believe, even though both feel like honest belief from the inside. Neither is faking it, but there’s still a distinction.
It can also be called division of labour. My comparative advantage may lie in bashing Wiggin heads or crafting arguments for why bashing Wiggin heads is good or organizing the logistics so our heads don’t get bashed by Wiggins so that we can bash more of theirs.
I don’t see from a consquentalist stand point what is so different between me pyhsically bashing a Wiggin head, pressing a button that activates a machine that bashes as Wiggin head and manipulating someone into bashing a Wiggin head. To call only one of these indication of “real” belief that bashing Wiggin heads is good (and I hope we all agree it is!) seems not very useful at all, especially since it is perfectly possible that the preferences are literally identical inside their brains but merely the means available to them are what varies.
The distinction seems useful only in very peculiar circumstances, like trying to discover my preferences with regards to personal physical confrontation or combat.
No she is not. Except in the sense that she is perhaps one small step in something that does fitness
calculations, but looking at her brain you wouldn’t find fitness maximization calculations being done just
execution of old adaptations.
These old adaptations encode rough heuristics of limited applicability which approximate fitness calculations (if the environment has been fairly constant for long enough). They are actually there inside the brain. What else do you think the cuteness response as you used here is?
Religious people believe they believe in God. And many of them are correct on this.
Are they? So very few of them actually take their beliefs seriously. So very few of them actually behave as if their expected utility calculations are dominated by treats of eternal damnation and promises of eternal salvation.
It can also be called division of labour. My comparative advantage may lie in bashing Wiggin heads or crafting
arguments for why bashing Wiggin heads is good or organizing the logistics so our heads don’t get bashed by
Wiggins so that we can bash more of theirs.
Yes. The problem is that this is exactly the rationalisation that someone would use if it weren’t true. Then again, it might be true.
We need to distinguish
(type A) Someone wants to rise in power within a certain group, advocates violence against a hated out-group, and remains largely protected from legal consequences himself because he doesn’t actually commit any violent acts. When asked, he claims his non-action is due to division-of-labour-reasoning.
(type B) Someone actually thinks violence against a certain out-group is a good thing (in the greater good sense), and doesn’t commit any violent acts himself based on division-of-labour-reasoning. When asked about his motivations, he is not (easily?) distinguishable from (A).
What’s the difference? The difference is that (type A) should be discouraged from encouraging violence. If a (type A) successfully encourages a group of followers to commit violence against a hated out-group , people get hurt. This was not the (type A)’s intention, it’s just an unfortunate side effect that he doesn’t really care about.
(type B)s, on the other hand, should be listened to, and their arguments weighed carefully. For the greater good, you know. In fact this seems like a good reason for (type B)s to signal that they themselves do not in any way profit from the violence.
What are your priors? More (type B)? More (type A)?
I don’t see from a consquentalist stand point what is so different between me pyhsically bashing a Wiggin
head, pressing a button that activates a machine that bashes as Wiggin head and manipulating someone
into bashing a Wiggin head.
You said it yourself : not being the one who actually commits the violent acts provides some legal protection. Your not ending up in jail is a consequence. (I don’t actually know what a Wiggin head is, I assume “bashing a Wiggin head” is some socially unaccepted form of violence).
No she is not. Except in the sense that she is perhaps one small step in something that does fitness calculations, but looking at her brain you wouldn’t find fitness maximization calculations being done just execution of old adaptations.
Religious people believe they believe in God. And many of them are correct on this.
It can also be called division of labour. My comparative advantage may lie in bashing Wiggin heads or crafting arguments for why bashing Wiggin heads is good or organizing the logistics so our heads don’t get bashed by Wiggins so that we can bash more of theirs.
I don’t see from a consquentalist stand point what is so different between me pyhsically bashing a Wiggin head, pressing a button that activates a machine that bashes as Wiggin head and manipulating someone into bashing a Wiggin head. To call only one of these indication of “real” belief that bashing Wiggin heads is good (and I hope we all agree it is!) seems not very useful at all, especially since it is perfectly possible that the preferences are literally identical inside their brains but merely the means available to them are what varies.
The distinction seems useful only in very peculiar circumstances, like trying to discover my preferences with regards to personal physical confrontation or combat.
These old adaptations encode rough heuristics of limited applicability which approximate fitness calculations (if the environment has been fairly constant for long enough). They are actually there inside the brain. What else do you think the cuteness response as you used here is?
Are they? So very few of them actually take their beliefs seriously. So very few of them actually behave as if their expected utility calculations are dominated by treats of eternal damnation and promises of eternal salvation.
Yes. The problem is that this is exactly the rationalisation that someone would use if it weren’t true. Then again, it might be true.
We need to distinguish
(type A) Someone wants to rise in power within a certain group, advocates violence against a hated out-group, and remains largely protected from legal consequences himself because he doesn’t actually commit any violent acts. When asked, he claims his non-action is due to division-of-labour-reasoning.
(type B) Someone actually thinks violence against a certain out-group is a good thing (in the greater good sense), and doesn’t commit any violent acts himself based on division-of-labour-reasoning. When asked about his motivations, he is not (easily?) distinguishable from (A).
What’s the difference? The difference is that (type A) should be discouraged from encouraging violence. If a (type A) successfully encourages a group of followers to commit violence against a hated out-group , people get hurt. This was not the (type A)’s intention, it’s just an unfortunate side effect that he doesn’t really care about.
(type B)s, on the other hand, should be listened to, and their arguments weighed carefully. For the greater good, you know. In fact this seems like a good reason for (type B)s to signal that they themselves do not in any way profit from the violence.
What are your priors? More (type B)? More (type A)?
You said it yourself : not being the one who actually commits the violent acts provides some legal protection. Your not ending up in jail is a consequence. (I don’t actually know what a Wiggin head is, I assume “bashing a Wiggin head” is some socially unaccepted form of violence).
See here: wiggin