It’s worth being careful to acknowledge that this set of assumptions is far more limited than the game-theoretical underpinnings. Because it requires interpersonal utility summation, you can’t normalize in the same ways, and you need to do a LOT more work to show that any given situation fits this model. Most situations and policies don’t even fit the more general individual-utility model, and I suspect even fewer will fit this extension.
That said, I like having it formalized, and I look forward to the extension to multi-coalition situations. A spy can benefit Russia and the world more than they hurt the average US resident.
It’s worth being careful to acknowledge that this set of assumptions is far more limited than the game-theoretical underpinnings. Because it requires interpersonal utility summation, you can’t normalize in the same ways, and you need to do a LOT more work to show that any given situation fits this model. Most situations and policies don’t even fit the more general individual-utility model, and I suspect even fewer will fit this extension.
That said, I like having it formalized, and I look forward to the extension to multi-coalition situations. A spy can benefit Russia and the world more than they hurt the average US resident.
I very much agree that interpersonal utility comparability is a strong assumption. I’ll add a note.