Easy: how do the physical and chemical processes in the brain result in our behavior? The word “easy” is used tongue-in-cheek.
Hard: why is behavior accompanied by consciousness? If we can explain all human behavior as a series of processes going on in the neurons, why is there “a light on inside”? Why are we not all philosophical zombies?
Real: how do the physical and the chemical processes in the brain result in the properties we associate with consciousness? This formulation evolved as an answer to the perceived inadequacy of the easy and hard problems.
“Consciousness” means multiple things, so there are multiple problems of consciousness.
The Hard Problem is specifically about qualia AKA phenomenal consciousness. And it’s also the main objection to physicalism, so it’s not something a philosopher can ignore. A biologist might be able to focus on the “real problem” of how consciousness works, but that doesn’t make the hard problem vanish.
The reason is that having a way that consciousness can exist independently of physical phenomena is the only mechanism by which most[5] religions can plausibly promise life after death.
That may be the reason laypeople believe in dualism, but it’s not the reason professional philosophers do...indeed, David Chalmers has an argument for property dualism that has nothing to do with survival after death.
If you want to show that physicalism is true, instead of assuming it, you need some way of resolving or disolving the HP.
Right out of the gate I will reject dualism. Any phenomenon that defies physics needs extreme evidence which I simply don’t see.
What would you expect it to look like? For many philosophers , physicalism depends on reductionism, so the irreducibility of (some aspect of) consciousness actually is the evidence.
For the same reason, I reject theories with metaphysical claims like “consciousness is this or that physical phenomenon”. Integrated information theory and orchestrated objective reduction seem very bold in this regard. Per Occam’s razor, it should be more parsimonious to expect consciousness to be a product of our brain, specifically an algorithm. In contrast to Penrose, I see no reason to believe human thought is above computability since I find his Gödelian argument conceivable, but certainly no hard proof of this extraordinary claim.
The fact that the computational theory isn’t false for the reason Penrose states doesn’t equate to at reason for thinking it’s actually true. The computational theory also fares particularly badly with the HP, because while it’s easy to explain behaviour, and therefore the behavioural aspects of consciousness, with algorithms, there is no reason any algorithm should feel like anything from the inside.
Thus, I believe consciousness is a regular algorithm that can be run on any Turing machine. But what kind of algorithm? As the hard problem of consciousness posits, there is no process happening in your life that couldn’t happen without consciousness.
The HP doesn’t posit anything, because it is a question not a statement.
If all your actions can be explained by physics running algorithms, then “conscious” deliberation, planning, etc. can all in principle run without you ever feeling conscious at all.
But your behaviour can be explained by your consciousness as well! The argument that consciousness is causally idle needs some reason to believe that physical causality is the only valid kind..and that would come from reductionism..if reductionism were true. But we don’t know how it’s true in the case of phenomenal consciousness!
On this much, I agree with mysterianism
Mysterianism is the claim that consciousness is real, is identical to physical brain activity, but inexplicably so. So it’s not an illusion ,because of the “real”, and it’s not epiphenomenalism, because it regards consciousness as partaking in physical casualty.
This reasoning leads me firmly into the illusionist camp. We have systematically excluded all ways in which consciousness could plausibly exist or even have evolved. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that it cannot exist in the way we usually think of it. This is resolved by reducing it to an epiphenomenal illusion. Epiphenomenal means “a phenomenon that exists as a consequence of other phenomena”. Just as natural numbers will automatically give rise to self-referential Gödel sentences, I believe that the algorithms running in our brain automatically gave rise to consciousness and that we cannot have one without the other
OK, but that’s not illusonism.
Illusonism is usually a claim about qualia specifically. As such , it quite possibly self-refuting, because if it seems to you have qualia...then something seems to you.
Try to define, grasp, or meet your consciousness and, as experienced meditators can attest, you will fail.
The claim that meditation disproves consciousness wholesale is bizarre, because meditation is an act of enhanced and directed awareness, and awareness is another of the many meanings of “consciousness”. What meditators actually claim not to find is a Homuncular self or central scrutiniser.
But that’s not the aspect of consciousness you are illusionist or sceptical about.
“Consciousness” means multiple things, so there are multiple problems of consciousness.
The Hard Problem is specifically about qualia AKA phenomenal consciousness. And it’s also the main objection to physicalism, so it’s not something a philosopher can ignore. A biologist might be able to focus on the “real problem” of how consciousness works, but that doesn’t make the hard problem vanish.
That may be the reason laypeople believe in dualism, but it’s not the reason professional philosophers do...indeed, David Chalmers has an argument for property dualism that has nothing to do with survival after death.
If you want to show that physicalism is true, instead of assuming it, you need some way of resolving or disolving the HP.
What would you expect it to look like? For many philosophers , physicalism depends on reductionism, so the irreducibility of (some aspect of) consciousness actually is the evidence.
The fact that the computational theory isn’t false for the reason Penrose states doesn’t equate to at reason for thinking it’s actually true. The computational theory also fares particularly badly with the HP, because while it’s easy to explain behaviour, and therefore the behavioural aspects of consciousness, with algorithms, there is no reason any algorithm should feel like anything from the inside.
The HP doesn’t posit anything, because it is a question not a statement.
If all your actions can be explained by physics running algorithms, then “conscious” deliberation, planning, etc. can all in principle run without you ever feeling conscious at all.
But your behaviour can be explained by your consciousness as well! The argument that consciousness is causally idle needs some reason to believe that physical causality is the only valid kind..and that would come from reductionism..if reductionism were true. But we don’t know how it’s true in the case of phenomenal consciousness!
Mysterianism is the claim that consciousness is real, is identical to physical brain activity, but inexplicably so. So it’s not an illusion ,because of the “real”, and it’s not epiphenomenalism, because it regards consciousness as partaking in physical casualty.
OK, but that’s not illusonism.
Illusonism is usually a claim about qualia specifically. As such , it quite possibly self-refuting, because if it seems to you have qualia...then something seems to you.
The claim that meditation disproves consciousness wholesale is bizarre, because meditation is an act of enhanced and directed awareness, and awareness is another of the many meanings of “consciousness”. What meditators actually claim not to find is a Homuncular self or central scrutiniser.
But that’s not the aspect of consciousness you are illusionist or sceptical about.