But everything is kinda like this. When I translate the abstract concepts in my head into these words that I’m typing, I just do the information processing, I can maybe focus on different aspects of it consciously, but I don’t know what my brain is doing and can’t make a conscious decision to use someone else’s word-generation method instead of my own.
I would say the process that maps concepts to words is outside of me, so the fact that it happens unconsciously is in harmony with my argument. If I’m seeking a word for a concept, it feels like I direct my attention to the concept, and then all of its associations are handed back to me, one of the strongest ones being the word I’m looking for. That is, the retrieval of the word requires hitting an external memory store to get the concept’s associations.
On the other hand, the choice of concept to convey is made by me. I also choose whether to use the first word I find, or to look for a better one. Plus I choose to sit down and write in the first place. Unlike looking up words from my memory, where the words I receive are out of my control, I could have made these choices differently if I wanted to. Thus, they are part of my limited domain within the brain. You could say, “those choices are making themselves,” but then what are people referring to when they say a person did something consciously? There must be a physical distinction between conscious and unconscious actions, and that’s where I suspect you’ll find a reasonable definition of a “self module.”
Another way of putting this is that every process in the brain that can be thought of as conscious, can also be thought of as unconscious if you break it into small pieces.
I agree completely with that. But the visual processing that occurs to produce optical illusions cannot be thought of as conscious, period. Anything I would call conscious excludes that visual processing layer. It is not a “perfectly valid component of the thinking I do,” because it happens before I get access to the information to think about it.
If you put on a pair of warped glasses that distort your vision, you would not call those glasses part of your thinking process. But when the visual information you are receiving is warped in exactly the same way due to an optical illusion, you say it’s your own reasoning that made it like that. As far as I’m concerned, the only real difference is that you can’t remove your visual processing system. It’s like a pair of warped glasses that is glued to your face.
To be fair, this might be just another semantic argument. Maybe if we both understood the brain in perfect detail, we would still disagree about whether to call some specific part of it “us.” Or maybe I would change my mind at that point. I get the feeling you’ve investigated the brain more than me, and maybe you reach a point in your learning where you’re forced to discard the default model. Still, I think the position I’ve laid out has to be the default position in absence of any specific knowledge about the brain, because this is the model which is clearly suggested by our day-to-day experience.
I would say the process that maps concepts to words is outside of me, so the fact that it happens unconsciously is in harmony with my argument. If I’m seeking a word for a concept, it feels like I direct my attention to the concept, and then all of its associations are handed back to me, one of the strongest ones being the word I’m looking for. That is, the retrieval of the word requires hitting an external memory store to get the concept’s associations.
On the other hand, the choice of concept to convey is made by me. I also choose whether to use the first word I find, or to look for a better one. Plus I choose to sit down and write in the first place. Unlike looking up words from my memory, where the words I receive are out of my control, I could have made these choices differently if I wanted to. Thus, they are part of my limited domain within the brain. You could say, “those choices are making themselves,” but then what are people referring to when they say a person did something consciously? There must be a physical distinction between conscious and unconscious actions, and that’s where I suspect you’ll find a reasonable definition of a “self module.”
I agree completely with that. But the visual processing that occurs to produce optical illusions cannot be thought of as conscious, period. Anything I would call conscious excludes that visual processing layer. It is not a “perfectly valid component of the thinking I do,” because it happens before I get access to the information to think about it.
If you put on a pair of warped glasses that distort your vision, you would not call those glasses part of your thinking process. But when the visual information you are receiving is warped in exactly the same way due to an optical illusion, you say it’s your own reasoning that made it like that. As far as I’m concerned, the only real difference is that you can’t remove your visual processing system. It’s like a pair of warped glasses that is glued to your face.
To be fair, this might be just another semantic argument. Maybe if we both understood the brain in perfect detail, we would still disagree about whether to call some specific part of it “us.” Or maybe I would change my mind at that point. I get the feeling you’ve investigated the brain more than me, and maybe you reach a point in your learning where you’re forced to discard the default model. Still, I think the position I’ve laid out has to be the default position in absence of any specific knowledge about the brain, because this is the model which is clearly suggested by our day-to-day experience.