Extinction of humanity just means humanity not existing in the future, so the Linear Utility Hypothesis does imply its value is 0. If you make an exception and add a penalty for extinction that is larger than the Linear Utility Hypothesis would dictate, then the Linear Utility Hypothesis applied to other outcomes would still imply that when considering sufficiently large potential future populations, this extinction penalty becomes negligible in comparison.
See this thread. there is no finite number of lives that reach utopia, for which I would accept Omega’s bet at a 90% chance of extinction.
Human extinction now for me is worse than losing 10 trillion people, if the global population was 100 trillion.
My disutility of extinction isn’t just the number of lives lost. It involves the termination of all future potential of humanity, and I’m not sure how to value that, but see the bolded.
I don’t assign a disutility to extinction, and my preference with regards to extinction is probably lexicographic with respect to some other things (see above).
It was specified that the total future population in each scenario was 10^100 and 10^102. These numbers are the future people that couldn’t exist if humanity goes extinct.
Extinction of humanity just means humanity not existing in the future, so the Linear Utility Hypothesis does imply its value is 0. If you make an exception and add a penalty for extinction that is larger than the Linear Utility Hypothesis would dictate, then the Linear Utility Hypothesis applied to other outcomes would still imply that when considering sufficiently large potential future populations, this extinction penalty becomes negligible in comparison.
See this thread. there is no finite number of lives that reach utopia, for which I would accept Omega’s bet at a 90% chance of extinction.
Human extinction now for me is worse than losing 10 trillion people, if the global population was 100 trillion.
My disutility of extinction isn’t just the number of lives lost. It involves the termination of all future potential of humanity, and I’m not sure how to value that, but see the bolded.
I don’t assign a disutility to extinction, and my preference with regards to extinction is probably lexicographic with respect to some other things (see above).
That’s a reasonable value judgement, but it’s not what the Linear Utility Hypothesis would predict.
My point is that for me, extinction is not equivalent to losing current amount of lives now.
This is because extinction destroys all potential future utility. It destroys thw potential of humanity.
I’m saying that extinction can’t be evaluated normally, so you need a better example to state your argument against LUH.
Extinction now is worse than losing X people, if the global human population is 10 X, irregardless of how large X is.
That position above is independent of the linear utility hypothesis.
It was specified that the total future population in each scenario was 10^100 and 10^102. These numbers are the future people that couldn’t exist if humanity goes extinct.