Well, it looks like you declare “outperforming” by your own metric, not by anything generally accepted.
(Also, I take issue with the last two. The philosophical ideas about time are generally not about time, but about “time”, i.e. about how humans perceive and understand passage of time. So distinguishing between A and B is about humans, not about time, unlike, say, Special and General Relativity, which provide a useful model of time and spacetime.
A non-epistemic theory of truth (e.g. there is an objective truth we try to learn) is detrimental in general, because it inevitably deteriorates into debates about untestables, like other branches of a hypothetical multiverse and how to behave morally in an infinite universe.)
Also, most people here, while giving lip service to non-libertarian views of free will, sneak it in anyway, as evidenced by relying on “free choice” in nearly all decision theory discussions.
Well, it looks like you declare “outperforming” by your own metric, not by anything generally accepted.
I am indeed basing my view that philosophers are wrong about stuff on investigating the specific claims philosophers make.
If there were a (short) proof that philosophers were wrong about X that philosophers already accepted, I assume they would just stop believing X and the problem would be solved.
The philosophical ideas about time are generally not about time, but about “time”, i.e. about how humans perceive and understand passage of time.
Nope, the 20th-century philosophical literature discussing time is about time itself, not about (e.g.) human psychological or cultural perceptions of time.
There is also discussion of humans’ perception and construction of time—e.g., in Kant—but that’s not the context in which A-theory and B-theory are debated.
The A-theory and B-theory were introduced in 1908, before many philosophers (or even physicsts) had heard of special relativity; and ‘this view seems unbelievably crazy given special relativity’ is in fact one of the main arguments that gets cited in the literature against the A-theory of time.
A non-epistemic theory of truth (e.g. there is an objective truth we try to learn) is detrimental in general, because it inevitably deteriorates into debates about untestables, like other branches of a hypothetical multiverse and how to behave morally in an infinite universe.)
“It’s raining” is true even if you can’t check. Also, what’s testable for one person is different from what’s testable for another person. Rather than saying that different things are ‘true’ or ‘false’ or ‘neither true nor false’ depending on which person you are, simpler to just say that “snow is white” is true iff snow is white.
It’s not like there’s any difficulty in defining a predicate that satisfies the correspondence theory of truth, and this predicate is much closer to what people ordinarily mean by “true” than any epistemic theory of truth’s “true” is. So demanding that we abandon the ordinary thing people mean by “truth” just seems confusing and unnecessary.
Doubly so when there’s uncertainty or flux about which things are testable. Who can possibly keep track of which things are true vs. false vs. meaningless, when the limits of testability are always changing? Seems exhausting.
Also, most people here, while giving lip service to non-libertarian views of free will, sneak it in anyway, as evidenced by relying on “free choice” in nearly all decision theory discussions.
This is a very bad argument. Using the phrase “free choice” doesn’t imply that you endorse libertarian free will.
Well, we may have had this argument before, likely more than once, so probably no point rehashing it. I appreciate you expressing your views succinctly though.
Well, it looks like you declare “outperforming” by your own metric, not by anything generally accepted.
(Also, I take issue with the last two. The philosophical ideas about time are generally not about time, but about “time”, i.e. about how humans perceive and understand passage of time. So distinguishing between A and B is about humans, not about time, unlike, say, Special and General Relativity, which provide a useful model of time and spacetime.
A non-epistemic theory of truth (e.g. there is an objective truth we try to learn) is detrimental in general, because it inevitably deteriorates into debates about untestables, like other branches of a hypothetical multiverse and how to behave morally in an infinite universe.)
Also, most people here, while giving lip service to non-libertarian views of free will, sneak it in anyway, as evidenced by relying on “free choice” in nearly all decision theory discussions.
I am indeed basing my view that philosophers are wrong about stuff on investigating the specific claims philosophers make.
If there were a (short) proof that philosophers were wrong about X that philosophers already accepted, I assume they would just stop believing X and the problem would be solved.
Nope, the 20th-century philosophical literature discussing time is about time itself, not about (e.g.) human psychological or cultural perceptions of time.
There is also discussion of humans’ perception and construction of time—e.g., in Kant—but that’s not the context in which A-theory and B-theory are debated.
The A-theory and B-theory were introduced in 1908, before many philosophers (or even physicsts) had heard of special relativity; and ‘this view seems unbelievably crazy given special relativity’ is in fact one of the main arguments that gets cited in the literature against the A-theory of time.
“It’s raining” is true even if you can’t check. Also, what’s testable for one person is different from what’s testable for another person. Rather than saying that different things are ‘true’ or ‘false’ or ‘neither true nor false’ depending on which person you are, simpler to just say that “snow is white” is true iff snow is white.
It’s not like there’s any difficulty in defining a predicate that satisfies the correspondence theory of truth, and this predicate is much closer to what people ordinarily mean by “true” than any epistemic theory of truth’s “true” is. So demanding that we abandon the ordinary thing people mean by “truth” just seems confusing and unnecessary.
Doubly so when there’s uncertainty or flux about which things are testable. Who can possibly keep track of which things are true vs. false vs. meaningless, when the limits of testability are always changing? Seems exhausting.
This is a very bad argument. Using the phrase “free choice” doesn’t imply that you endorse libertarian free will.
Well, we may have had this argument before, likely more than once, so probably no point rehashing it. I appreciate you expressing your views succinctly though.