I do think that a reasonable person can start off with a much higher prior probability on epiphenomenalism than on illusionism (and indeed, many intellectuals have done so), because the problems with epiphenomenalism are less immediately obvious (to many people) than the problems with illusionism. But by the time you’ve finished reading the Sequences, I don’t think you can reasonably hold that position anymore.
“Robin, you are suffering from overconfidence bias in assuming that the universe exists. Surely there is some chance that the universe is of size zero.”
“James, if the universe doesn’t exist, it would still be nice to know whether it’s an infinite or a finite universe that doesn’t exist.”
Ha! You think pulling that old “universe doesn’t exist” trick will stop me? It won’t even slow me down!
It’s not that I’m ruling out the possibility that the universe doesn’t exist. It’s just that, even if nothing exists, I still want to understand the nothing as best I can. My curiosity doesn’t suddenly go away just because there’s no reality, you know!
The nature of “reality” is something about which I’m still confused, which leaves open the possibility that there isn’t any such thing. But Egan’s Law still applies: “It all adds up to normality.” Apples didn’t stop falling when Einstein disproved Newton’s theory of gravity.
Sure, when the dust settles, it could turn out that apples don’t exist, Earth doesn’t exist, reality doesn’t exist. But the nonexistent apples will still fall toward the nonexistent ground at a meaningless rate of 9.8 m/s2.
You say the universe doesn’t exist? Fine, suppose I believe that—though it’s not clear what I’m supposed to believe, aside from repeating the words.
By “positive solution” I mean a claim about what is the correct theory, not a claim about what is the wrong theory. I am well aware that he argues against epiphenomenalism.
Of course, it is far from the case that the heuristics you mentioned have led most or many people to illusionism.
I do think that a reasonable person can start off with a much higher prior probability on epiphenomenalism than on illusionism (and indeed, many intellectuals have done so), because the problems with epiphenomenalism are less immediately obvious (to many people) than the problems with illusionism. But by the time you’ve finished reading the Sequences, I don’t think you can reasonably hold that position anymore.
I’ve read the sequences, and they don’t argue for illusionism, and they don’t argue for any other positive solution to the HP.
They argue against epiphenomenalism, and introduce a bunch of other relevant ideas and heuristics.
Including the aforementioned:
By “positive solution” I mean a claim about what is the correct theory, not a claim about what is the wrong theory. I am well aware that he argues against epiphenomenalism.
Of course, it is far from the case that the heuristics you mentioned have led most or many people to illusionism.