Re: “UBI in the context of automation”, that’s a great point and I can definitely see what you’re getting at! The answer is that this is part 1 of a 2-part series—Part 1 is how to implement UBI realistically and Part 2 is how to pay for it. Paying for it is an equally or even more interesting problem.
Re: penalizing productivity, it’s pretty unclear from the research whether NIT actually reduces employment (the main side effect of penalizing productivity). Of course theoretically it should, but the data isn’t really conclusive in either direction. Bunch of links above.
A modified EITC wouldn’t have pressure to dismantle the current welfare system because it’s a LOT cheaper than 40% of the US budget. Adding a pure UBI on top of the existing welfare systems would make redistribution like 70-80% of the US budget, which is a pretty dicey political stance.
Personally, I really don’t get the “easy to maintain” argument for UBI, esp. given my analysis above. You’d rather have a program that costs $4 trillion with zero maintenance costs, than a similarly impactful program that costs $~650 billion with maintenance costs? It’s kind of a reductive argument that only makes sense when you don’t look at the actual numbers behind implementing a policy idea.
it’s pretty unclear from the research whether NIT actually reduces employment (the main side effect of penalizing productivity). Of course theoretically it should, but the data isn’t really conclusive in either direction.
I think as a general rule, when something theoretically is supposed to happen and we do not have conclusive practical data, its reasonable to assume that it indeed will happen.
You’d rather have a program that costs $4 trillion with zero maintenance costs, than a similarly impactful program that costs $~650 billion with maintenance costs?
Depends on the maintenance cost, obviously. But again the problem here is that our best theories strongly predict that impact will not be similar. NIT creates perversive incentives that UBI doesn’t. And incentives matter—economy isn’t a zero sum game.
So a more appropriate question is: Would you rather invest 4 trillions in a company which evaluation will go up or 650 billions in a company which evaluation will go down?
pretty dicey political stance.
I predict that implementation of general NIT will face much more pushback than implementation of UBI. No matter how minor are the required tweaks to EITC they are politically unfeasible in US. Meanwhile, UBI has support all around the political spectrum, from leftists to libertarians.
Re: “UBI in the context of automation”, that’s a great point and I can definitely see what you’re getting at! The answer is that this is part 1 of a 2-part series—Part 1 is how to implement UBI realistically and Part 2 is how to pay for it. Paying for it is an equally or even more interesting problem.
Re: penalizing productivity, it’s pretty unclear from the research whether NIT actually reduces employment (the main side effect of penalizing productivity). Of course theoretically it should, but the data isn’t really conclusive in either direction. Bunch of links above.
A modified EITC wouldn’t have pressure to dismantle the current welfare system because it’s a LOT cheaper than 40% of the US budget. Adding a pure UBI on top of the existing welfare systems would make redistribution like 70-80% of the US budget, which is a pretty dicey political stance.
Personally, I really don’t get the “easy to maintain” argument for UBI, esp. given my analysis above. You’d rather have a program that costs $4 trillion with zero maintenance costs, than a similarly impactful program that costs $~650 billion with maintenance costs? It’s kind of a reductive argument that only makes sense when you don’t look at the actual numbers behind implementing a policy idea.
Looking forward to the next part then.
I think as a general rule, when something theoretically is supposed to happen and we do not have conclusive practical data, its reasonable to assume that it indeed will happen.
Depends on the maintenance cost, obviously. But again the problem here is that our best theories strongly predict that impact will not be similar. NIT creates perversive incentives that UBI doesn’t. And incentives matter—economy isn’t a zero sum game.
So a more appropriate question is: Would you rather invest 4 trillions in a company which evaluation will go up or 650 billions in a company which evaluation will go down?
I predict that implementation of general NIT will face much more pushback than implementation of UBI. No matter how minor are the required tweaks to EITC they are politically unfeasible in US. Meanwhile, UBI has support all around the political spectrum, from leftists to libertarians.