Sorry for the delay in replying. No, I don’t have any objection to the reading of the counterfactual. However I fail to connect it to the question I posed.
In a determined universe, the future is completely determined whether any conscious entity in it can predict it or not. No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it.
Determinism, like solipsism, is a logically consistent system of belief. It cannot be proven wrong anymore than solpsism can be, since the only “evidence” disproving it, if any, lies with the entity believing it, not outside.
Do you feel that you are a purposeless entity whose actions and beliefs have no significance whatsoever on the future? If so, your feelings are very much consistent with your belief in determinism. If not, it may be time to take into consideration the evidence in the form of your feelings.
In a determined universe, the future is completely determined whether any conscious entity in it can predict it or not. No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it. [emphasis added]
Wrong. If Alice orders the fettucini in world A, she gets fettucini, but if Alice’ orders eggplant in world A, she gets eggplant. The future is not fixed in advance—it is a function of the present, and your acts in the present create the future.
There’s an old Nozick quote that I found in Daniel Dennett’s Elbow Room: “No one has ever announced that because determinism is true thermostats do not control temperature.” Our actions and beliefs have exactly the same ontological significance as the switching and setting of the thermostat. Tell me in what sense a thermostat does not control the temperature.
Ganapati is partially right. In deterministic universe (DU) initial conditions define all history from beginning to the end by definition. If it is predetermined that Alice will order fettucini, she will order fettucini. But it doesn’t mean that Alice must order fetuccini. I’ll elaborate on that further.
No one inside DU can precisely predict future. Proof: Let’s suppose we can exactly predict future, then A) we can change it, thus proving that prediction was incorrect, B) we can’t change it a bit. How can case B be the case? It can’t. Prediction brings information about the future, and so it changes our actions. Let p be prediction, and F(p) be prediction, given that we know prediction p. For case B to be possible, function F(p) must have fixed point p’=F(p’), but information from future brings entropy, which causes future entropy to increase, so increasing prediction’s entropy and so on. Thus, there’s cannot be fixed point. QED.
No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it.
Given 1, no one can be sure that his/her actions predetermined to wanish. On the other hand, if one decided to abstain from acting, then it is more likely he/she is predetermined to fail. Thus, his/her actions (if any) have less probability to affect future. On the third hand, if one stands up and wins, then only then one will know that one was predetermined to win, not a second earlier.
If Alice cannot decide what she likes more, she cannot just say “Oh! I must eat fettucini. It is my fate.”, she haven’t and cannot have such information in principle. She must decide for herself, determination or not. And if external observer (let’s call him god) will come down and say to Alice “It’s your fate to eat fettucini.” (thus effectively making determenistic universe undeterministic), no single physical law will force Alice to do it.
I’d like to dispute your usage of “predetermined” there: like “fated”, it implies an establishment in advance, rather than by events. A game of Agricola is predetermined to last 14 turns, even in a nondeterministic universe, because no change to gameplay at any point during the game will cause it to terminate before or after the 14th turn. The rules say 14, and that’s fixed in advance. (Factors outside the game may cause mistakes to be made or the game not to finish, but those are both different from the game lasting 13 or 15 turns.) On the opposite side, an arbitrary game of chess is not predetermined to last (as that one did) 24 turns, even in a deterministic universe, because a (counterfactual) change to gameplay could easily cause it to last fewer or more.
If one may determine without knowing Alice’s actions what dish she will be served (e.g. if the eggplant is spoiled), then she may be doomed to get that dish, but in that case the (deterministic or nondeterministic) causal chain leading to her dish does not pass through her decision. And that makes the difference.
I’m not sure that I sufficiently understand you. “Fated” implies that no matter what one do, one will end up as fate dictates, right? In other words: in all counterfactual universes one’s fate is same. Predetermination I speak of is different. It is a property of deterministic universe: all events are determined by initial conditions only.
When Alice decides what she will order she can construct in her mind bunch of different universes, and predetermination doesn’t mean that in all those constructed universes she will get fettucini, predetermination means that only one constructed universe will be factual. As I proved in previous post Alice cannot know in advance which constructed universe is factual. Alice cannot know that she’s in universe A where she’s predetermined to eat fettucini, or that she’s in universe B where she’s to eat eggplant. And her decision process is integral part of each of these universes.
Without her decision universe A cannot be universe A.
I’m sorry, do you have an objection to the reading of “counterfactual” elaborated in this thread?
Sorry for the delay in replying. No, I don’t have any objection to the reading of the counterfactual. However I fail to connect it to the question I posed.
In a determined universe, the future is completely determined whether any conscious entity in it can predict it or not. No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it.
Determinism, like solipsism, is a logically consistent system of belief. It cannot be proven wrong anymore than solpsism can be, since the only “evidence” disproving it, if any, lies with the entity believing it, not outside.
Do you feel that you are a purposeless entity whose actions and beliefs have no significance whatsoever on the future? If so, your feelings are very much consistent with your belief in determinism. If not, it may be time to take into consideration the evidence in the form of your feelings.
Thank you all for your time!
Wrong. If Alice orders the fettucini in world A, she gets fettucini, but if Alice’ orders eggplant in world A, she gets eggplant. The future is not fixed in advance—it is a function of the present, and your acts in the present create the future.
There’s an old Nozick quote that I found in Daniel Dennett’s Elbow Room: “No one has ever announced that because determinism is true thermostats do not control temperature.” Our actions and beliefs have exactly the same ontological significance as the switching and setting of the thermostat. Tell me in what sense a thermostat does not control the temperature.
Correction.
Ganapati is partially right. In deterministic universe (DU) initial conditions define all history from beginning to the end by definition. If it is predetermined that Alice will order fettucini, she will order fettucini. But it doesn’t mean that Alice must order fetuccini. I’ll elaborate on that further.
No one inside DU can precisely predict future. Proof: Let’s suppose we can exactly predict future, then A) we can change it, thus proving that prediction was incorrect, B) we can’t change it a bit. How can case B be the case? It can’t. Prediction brings information about the future, and so it changes our actions. Let p be prediction, and F(p) be prediction, given that we know prediction p. For case B to be possible, function F(p) must have fixed point p’=F(p’), but information from future brings entropy, which causes future entropy to increase, so increasing prediction’s entropy and so on. Thus, there’s cannot be fixed point. QED.
Given 1, no one can be sure that his/her actions predetermined to wanish. On the other hand, if one decided to abstain from acting, then it is more likely he/she is predetermined to fail. Thus, his/her actions (if any) have less probability to affect future. On the third hand, if one stands up and wins, then only then one will know that one was predetermined to win, not a second earlier.
If Alice cannot decide what she likes more, she cannot just say “Oh! I must eat fettucini. It is my fate.”, she haven’t and cannot have such information in principle. She must decide for herself, determination or not. And if external observer (let’s call him god) will come down and say to Alice “It’s your fate to eat fettucini.” (thus effectively making determenistic universe undeterministic), no single physical law will force Alice to do it.
I’d like to dispute your usage of “predetermined” there: like “fated”, it implies an establishment in advance, rather than by events. A game of Agricola is predetermined to last 14 turns, even in a nondeterministic universe, because no change to gameplay at any point during the game will cause it to terminate before or after the 14th turn. The rules say 14, and that’s fixed in advance. (Factors outside the game may cause mistakes to be made or the game not to finish, but those are both different from the game lasting 13 or 15 turns.) On the opposite side, an arbitrary game of chess is not predetermined to last (as that one did) 24 turns, even in a deterministic universe, because a (counterfactual) change to gameplay could easily cause it to last fewer or more.
If one may determine without knowing Alice’s actions what dish she will be served (e.g. if the eggplant is spoiled), then she may be doomed to get that dish, but in that case the (deterministic or nondeterministic) causal chain leading to her dish does not pass through her decision. And that makes the difference.
I’m not sure that I sufficiently understand you. “Fated” implies that no matter what one do, one will end up as fate dictates, right? In other words: in all counterfactual universes one’s fate is same. Predetermination I speak of is different. It is a property of deterministic universe: all events are determined by initial conditions only.
When Alice decides what she will order she can construct in her mind bunch of different universes, and predetermination doesn’t mean that in all those constructed universes she will get fettucini, predetermination means that only one constructed universe will be factual. As I proved in previous post Alice cannot know in advance which constructed universe is factual. Alice cannot know that she’s in universe A where she’s predetermined to eat fettucini, or that she’s in universe B where she’s to eat eggplant. And her decision process is integral part of each of these universes.
Without her decision universe A cannot be universe A.
So her decision is crucial part of causal chain.
Did I answer your question?
Edit: spellcheck.
I don’t like the connotations, but sure—that’s a mathematically consistent definition.