This is, quite obviously, a terrific article. One major quibble: your conclusion is rather circular. You assume a consequentialist utilitarian ethics, and then conclude, “Therefore, the optimal solution is to maximize the outcome under consequentialist utilitarian ethics!” I’m not sure it’s actually possible to avoid such circularity here, but it does feel a little unsatisfying to me.
On top of this, your dismissal of the “personal development” issue is a bit hand-wavy. That is, it’s one thing if I make a decision to go smoke crack—then the personal development required to get better is essentially penance for my evil decision. Likewise with obesity: I’ve sinned by getting fat, therefore, I must absolve my sins by getting thin. Just taking a pill would be like getting absolution without saying any Hail Marys, or some such. While I’m actually on your side on this point, this position does not logically bind us to go around getting kids hooked on crack so they can develop as people—they haven’t sinned, so they have no penance to do.
I don’t believe much in penance. (The dictionary I checked said “self punishment as a sign of repentance”. I don’t think either aspect is valuable.) It’s not related to the question of how we should treat people when they have conditions that are often under voluntary control.
We should convince them that (assuming they agree that it would be better to not have the condition) their best approach is to accept that the condition is at least partially under voluntary control, that control always appears hard, and therefore to change their lifestyle so as to address the problem. If they agree that the condition is a problem, and they find a magic bullet to solve the problem, then no penance is required. If there’s no magic bullet, then they can try to change their lifestyle, but there is no need to for them to punish themselves for not understanding the situation before.
This is, quite obviously, a terrific article. One major quibble: your conclusion is rather circular. You assume a consequentialist utilitarian ethics, and then conclude, “Therefore, the optimal solution is to maximize the outcome under consequentialist utilitarian ethics!” I’m not sure it’s actually possible to avoid such circularity here, but it does feel a little unsatisfying to me.
On top of this, your dismissal of the “personal development” issue is a bit hand-wavy. That is, it’s one thing if I make a decision to go smoke crack—then the personal development required to get better is essentially penance for my evil decision. Likewise with obesity: I’ve sinned by getting fat, therefore, I must absolve my sins by getting thin. Just taking a pill would be like getting absolution without saying any Hail Marys, or some such. While I’m actually on your side on this point, this position does not logically bind us to go around getting kids hooked on crack so they can develop as people—they haven’t sinned, so they have no penance to do.
I don’t believe much in penance. (The dictionary I checked said “self punishment as a sign of repentance”. I don’t think either aspect is valuable.) It’s not related to the question of how we should treat people when they have conditions that are often under voluntary control.
We should convince them that (assuming they agree that it would be better to not have the condition) their best approach is to accept that the condition is at least partially under voluntary control, that control always appears hard, and therefore to change their lifestyle so as to address the problem. If they agree that the condition is a problem, and they find a magic bullet to solve the problem, then no penance is required. If there’s no magic bullet, then they can try to change their lifestyle, but there is no need to for them to punish themselves for not understanding the situation before.