Those things you cite are valued because they cause pleasure.
No, they cause pleasure because they’re valued.
You are arguing that we seek things in accordance to and proportionally to the pleasure anticipated in achieving them. (please correct me if I’m getting you wrong)
I’m arguing that we can want stuff without anticipation of pleasure being necessary. And we can fail to want stuff where there is anticipation of pleasure.
How shall we distinguish between the two scenarios? What’s our anticipations for the world if your hypothesis is true vs if mine is true?
Here’s a test. I think that if your scenario held, everyone would be willing to rewire their brains to get more pleasure for things they don’t currently want; because then there’d be more anticipated pleasure. This doesn’t seem to hold—though we’ll only know for sure when the technology actually becomes available.
Here’s another test. I think that if my scenario holds, some atheists just before their anticipated deaths would still leave property to their offspring or to charities, instead of spending it all to prostitutes and recreational drugs in attempts to cram as much pleasure as possible before their death.
So I think the tests validate my position. Do you have some different tests in mind?
Your argument isn’t making any sense. Whether they are valued because they cause pleasure, or cause pleasure because they are valued makes no difference.
Either way, they cause pleasure.
Your argument is that we value them even though they don’t cause pleasure. You are trying to say there is something other than pleasure, yet you concede that all of your examples cause pleasure.
For your argument to work, we need to seek something that does not cause pleasure. I asked you to name a few, and you named “Knowledge, memory, and understanding. Personal and collective achievement. Honour. Other people’s pleasure.”
Then in your next post, you say ” they cause pleasure because they’re valued.”
That is exactly my point. There is nothing we seek that we don’t expect to derive pleasure from.
I don’t think your tests validate your position. The thought of leaving their belongings to others will cause pleasure. Many expect that pleasure to be deeper or more meaningful that prostitutes, and would therefore agree with your test while still holding to my position that people will seek the greatest expect pleasure.
I would place the standard of a Matrix-quality reality machine to accept lukeprogs offer. An orgasmium would not suffice, as I expect it to fail to live up to its promise. Wireheading would not work.
Double Edit to add a piece then fix the order it got put in.
Edit Again- Apologies, I confused this response with one below. Edited to remove confusion.
You are trying to say there is something other than pleasure, yet you concede that all of your examples cause pleasure.
If I was debating the structure of the atom, I could say that “there’s more to atoms than their protons”, and yet I would ‘concede’ that all atoms do contain protons. Or I’d say “there’s more to protons than just their mass” (they also have an electric charge), but all protons do have mass.
Why are you finding this hard to understand? Why would I need to discover an atom without protons or a proton without mass for me to believe that there’s more to atoms than protons (there’s also electrons and neutrons) or more to protons than their mass?
That is exactly my point. There is nothing we seek that we don’t expect to derive pleasure from.
You had made much stronger statements than that—you said “You think you want more than pleasure, but what else is there?” You also said “But saying we want more than pleasure? That doesn’t make sense. ”
Every atom may contain protons, but atoms are more than protons.
Every object of our desire may contain pleasure in its fullfillment, but the object of our desire is more than pleasure.
Does this analogy help you understand how your argument is faulty?
No, it doesn’t. I understand your analogy (parts vs the whole), but I do not understand how it relates to my point. I am sorry.
Is pleasure the proton in the analogy? Is the atom what we want? I don’t follow here.
You are also making the argument that we want things that don’t cause pleasure. Shouldn’t this be, in your analogy, an atom without a proton? In that case yes, you need to find an atom without a proton before I will believe there is an atom without a proton. (This same argument works if pleasure is any of the other atomic properties. Charge, mass, etc).
Or is pleasure the atom? If that is the case, then I can’t see where you argument is going. If pleasure is the atom, then your analogy supports my argument.
I am not trying to make a straw man, I genuinely don’t see the connections.
Similarly, we want things for more reasons other than the pleasure they give us.
Even if every time one of our desires is satisfied, we feel pleasure, doesn’t mean that pleasure is the only reason we have those desires. Similarly, even if an atom always has protons, doesn’t mean it doesn’t also have other components.
You are also making the argument that we want things that don’t cause pleasure. Shouldn’t this be, in your analogy, an atom without a proton?
ArisKateris should have picked electrons instead of protons, it makes the analogy a little less confusing. Desires without pleasure are like atoms without electrons. These are called “positive ions” and are not totally uncommon.
It personally seems obvious to me that we want things other than pleasure. For instance, I occasionally read books that I hate and am miserable reading because they are part of a series, and I want to complete the series. That’s what I want, and I don’t care if there’s less pleasure in the universe because of my actions.
No, they cause pleasure because they’re valued.
You are arguing that we seek things in accordance to and proportionally to the pleasure anticipated in achieving them. (please correct me if I’m getting you wrong)
I’m arguing that we can want stuff without anticipation of pleasure being necessary. And we can fail to want stuff where there is anticipation of pleasure.
How shall we distinguish between the two scenarios? What’s our anticipations for the world if your hypothesis is true vs if mine is true?
Here’s a test. I think that if your scenario held, everyone would be willing to rewire their brains to get more pleasure for things they don’t currently want; because then there’d be more anticipated pleasure. This doesn’t seem to hold—though we’ll only know for sure when the technology actually becomes available.
Here’s another test. I think that if my scenario holds, some atheists just before their anticipated deaths would still leave property to their offspring or to charities, instead of spending it all to prostitutes and recreational drugs in attempts to cram as much pleasure as possible before their death.
So I think the tests validate my position. Do you have some different tests in mind?
Your argument isn’t making any sense. Whether they are valued because they cause pleasure, or cause pleasure because they are valued makes no difference.
Either way, they cause pleasure. Your argument is that we value them even though they don’t cause pleasure. You are trying to say there is something other than pleasure, yet you concede that all of your examples cause pleasure.
For your argument to work, we need to seek something that does not cause pleasure. I asked you to name a few, and you named “Knowledge, memory, and understanding. Personal and collective achievement. Honour. Other people’s pleasure.”
Then in your next post, you say ” they cause pleasure because they’re valued.”
That is exactly my point. There is nothing we seek that we don’t expect to derive pleasure from.
I don’t think your tests validate your position. The thought of leaving their belongings to others will cause pleasure. Many expect that pleasure to be deeper or more meaningful that prostitutes, and would therefore agree with your test while still holding to my position that people will seek the greatest expect pleasure.
I would place the standard of a Matrix-quality reality machine to accept lukeprogs offer. An orgasmium would not suffice, as I expect it to fail to live up to its promise. Wireheading would not work.
Double Edit to add a piece then fix the order it got put in.
Edit Again- Apologies, I confused this response with one below. Edited to remove confusion.
If I was debating the structure of the atom, I could say that “there’s more to atoms than their protons”, and yet I would ‘concede’ that all atoms do contain protons. Or I’d say “there’s more to protons than just their mass” (they also have an electric charge), but all protons do have mass.
Why are you finding this hard to understand? Why would I need to discover an atom without protons or a proton without mass for me to believe that there’s more to atoms than protons (there’s also electrons and neutrons) or more to protons than their mass?
You had made much stronger statements than that—you said “You think you want more than pleasure, but what else is there?” You also said “But saying we want more than pleasure? That doesn’t make sense. ”
Every atom may contain protons, but atoms are more than protons. Every object of our desire may contain pleasure in its fullfillment, but the object of our desire is more than pleasure.
Does this analogy help you understand how your argument is faulty?
No, it doesn’t. I understand your analogy (parts vs the whole), but I do not understand how it relates to my point. I am sorry.
Is pleasure the proton in the analogy? Is the atom what we want? I don’t follow here.
You are also making the argument that we want things that don’t cause pleasure. Shouldn’t this be, in your analogy, an atom without a proton? In that case yes, you need to find an atom without a proton before I will believe there is an atom without a proton. (This same argument works if pleasure is any of the other atomic properties. Charge, mass, etc).
Or is pleasure the atom? If that is the case, then I can’t see where you argument is going. If pleasure is the atom, then your analogy supports my argument.
I am not trying to make a straw man, I genuinely don’t see the connections.
ArisKateris’ analogy is:
The reasons we want things are atoms.
Pleasure is protons.
Atoms have more components than protons.
Similarly, we want things for more reasons other than the pleasure they give us.
Even if every time one of our desires is satisfied, we feel pleasure, doesn’t mean that pleasure is the only reason we have those desires. Similarly, even if an atom always has protons, doesn’t mean it doesn’t also have other components.
ArisKateris should have picked electrons instead of protons, it makes the analogy a little less confusing. Desires without pleasure are like atoms without electrons. These are called “positive ions” and are not totally uncommon.
It personally seems obvious to me that we want things other than pleasure. For instance, I occasionally read books that I hate and am miserable reading because they are part of a series, and I want to complete the series. That’s what I want, and I don’t care if there’s less pleasure in the universe because of my actions.