A priori, nothing matters. But sentient beings cannot help but make value judgements regarding some of their mental states. This is why the quality of mental states matters.
Wanting something out there in the world to be some way, regardless of whether anyone will ever actually experience it, is different. A want is a proposition about reality whose apparent falsehood makes you feel bad. Why should we care about arbitrary propositions being true or false?
You haven’t read or paid much attention to the metaethics sequence yet, have you? Or do you simply disagree with pretty much all the major points of the first half of it?
I remember starting it, and putting it away because yes, I disagreed with so many things. Especially the present subject; I couldn’t find any arguments for the insistence on placating wants rather than improving experience. I’ll read it in full next week.
Why’s that?
A priori, nothing matters. But sentient beings cannot help but make value judgements regarding some of their mental states. This is why the quality of mental states matters.
Wanting something out there in the world to be some way, regardless of whether anyone will ever actually experience it, is different. A want is a proposition about reality whose apparent falsehood makes you feel bad. Why should we care about arbitrary propositions being true or false?
You haven’t read or paid much attention to the metaethics sequence yet, have you? Or do you simply disagree with pretty much all the major points of the first half of it?
Also relevant: Joy in the merely real
I remember starting it, and putting it away because yes, I disagreed with so many things. Especially the present subject; I couldn’t find any arguments for the insistence on placating wants rather than improving experience. I’ll read it in full next week.