Isn’t there a rule of Bayesianism that you shouldn’t be able to anticipate changing your mind in a predictable manner, but rather you should just update right now?
Perhaps rather than asking will you enter or leave the simulation it might be better to start with a person inside it, remove them from it, and then ask them if they want to go back.
Isn’t there a rule of Bayesianism that you shouldn’t be able to anticipate changing your mind in a predictable manner, but rather you should just update right now?
Changing your mind based on evidence and experiences are different. I am confident that if I eat a meal, my hunger will decrease. Does that mean I should update my hunger downward now without eating?
I can believe “If I wireheaded I would want to continue wireheading” and “I currently don’t want to wirehead” without contradiction and without much pressure to want to wirehead.
Changing your mind based on evidence and experiences are different. I am confident that if I eat a meal, my hunger will decrease. Does that mean I should update my hunger downward now without eating?
One’s hunger isn’t really an idea of the mind that one can change, yeah? I’d say that “changing your mind” (at least regarding particular ideas and beliefs) is different than “changing a body’s immediate reaction to a physical state” (like lacking nourishment: hunger).
If you conducted brain surgery on me I might want different things. I should not want those things now—indeed, I could not, since there are multiple possible surgeries.
“Wireheading” explicitly refers to a type of brain surgery, involving sticking wires in ones head. Some versions of it may not be surgical, but the point stands.
Isn’t there a rule of Bayesianism that you shouldn’t be able to anticipate changing your mind in a predictable manner, but rather you should just update right now?
Perhaps rather than asking will you enter or leave the simulation it might be better to start with a person inside it, remove them from it, and then ask them if they want to go back.
Changing your mind based on evidence and experiences are different. I am confident that if I eat a meal, my hunger will decrease. Does that mean I should update my hunger downward now without eating?
I can believe “If I wireheaded I would want to continue wireheading” and “I currently don’t want to wirehead” without contradiction and without much pressure to want to wirehead.
One’s hunger isn’t really an idea of the mind that one can change, yeah? I’d say that “changing your mind” (at least regarding particular ideas and beliefs) is different than “changing a body’s immediate reaction to a physical state” (like lacking nourishment: hunger).
If you conducted brain surgery on me I might want different things. I should not want those things now—indeed, I could not, since there are multiple possible surgeries.
“Wireheading” explicitly refers to a type of brain surgery, involving sticking wires in ones head. Some versions of it may not be surgical, but the point stands.