MWI is orthogonal to the question of different fundamental constants. MWI is just wavefunction realism plus no collapse plus ‘that’s OK’.
So, any quantum-governed system that generates local constants will do under MWI. The leading example of this would be String Theory.
MWI is important here because if only one branch is real, then you need to be just as lucky anyway—it doesn’t help unless the mechanism makes an unusually high density of livable rules. That would be convenient, but also very improbable.
Can you clarify? The first part sounds like MWI is irrelevant to the question of fine-tuning of universal constants. Are you saying that if only one Everett branch was real, then it would be unlikely to have things like a planet under the right circumstances for life, but that is accounted for by MWI, since it explores all the permutations of a universe with constants like ours?
If I’m getting this, then that means MWI accounts for things like “why is the earth in the right place” kinds of things, but not “why is the proton this particular mass” kinds of things
Well, if the laws of the universe were such that it were unlikely but not impossible for life to form, MWI would take care of the rest, yes.
BUT, if you combine MWI with something that sets the force laws and particle zoo of the later universe as an aspect of quantum state, then MWI helps a lot—instead of getting only one, it makes ALL† of those laws real.
† or in case of precise interference that completely forces certain sets of laws to have a perfectly zero component, nearly all. Or if half of them end up having a precisely zero component due to some symmetry, then, the other half of these rule-sets… etc. Considering the high-dimensional messiness of these proto-universe-theories, large swaths being nodal (having zero wavefunction) seems unlikely.
MWI is orthogonal to the question of different fundamental constants. MWI is just wavefunction realism plus no collapse plus ‘that’s OK’.
So, any quantum-governed system that generates local constants will do under MWI. The leading example of this would be String Theory.
MWI is important here because if only one branch is real, then you need to be just as lucky anyway—it doesn’t help unless the mechanism makes an unusually high density of livable rules. That would be convenient, but also very improbable.
Thanks, Luke
Can you clarify? The first part sounds like MWI is irrelevant to the question of fine-tuning of universal constants. Are you saying that if only one Everett branch was real, then it would be unlikely to have things like a planet under the right circumstances for life, but that is accounted for by MWI, since it explores all the permutations of a universe with constants like ours?
If I’m getting this, then that means MWI accounts for things like “why is the earth in the right place” kinds of things, but not “why is the proton this particular mass” kinds of things
Well, if the laws of the universe were such that it were unlikely but not impossible for life to form, MWI would take care of the rest, yes.
BUT, if you combine MWI with something that sets the force laws and particle zoo of the later universe as an aspect of quantum state, then MWI helps a lot—instead of getting only one, it makes ALL† of those laws real.
† or in case of precise interference that completely forces certain sets of laws to have a perfectly zero component, nearly all. Or if half of them end up having a precisely zero component due to some symmetry, then, the other half of these rule-sets… etc. Considering the high-dimensional messiness of these proto-universe-theories, large swaths being nodal (having zero wavefunction) seems unlikely.