If the correct metaphilosophy is that there is no way of assessing object level philosophical arguments, then any confident assertion of a philosophical claim is metaphilosophically wrong. And there are plenty of confident assertions of philosophical claims in the sequences. In Torture versus Dust Specks and the Free Will sequence, for instance, there is supposed to be a 100% correct answer, not an argument for your consideration.
What if we disagree on whether “the correct metaphilosophy is that there is no way of assessing object level philosophical arguments”?
Look, I’m not saying that the Sequences are, philosophically speaking, pure and without sin (I give the opposite of Eliezer’s answer in “Torture vs. Dust Speaks”, and consider the free will sequence to be unpersuasive and confused). But suppose some other Less Wrong commenter disagrees with me; what then? We just get mired in philosophical arguments, right? Because that’s the only way to “resolve” these disputes: arguments. There’s nothing else to appeal to.
It’s just a fundamentally different situation, totally unlike the question of study replication or “does paper X actually mention topic Y at all” or anything else along these lines.
What if we disagree on whether “the correct metaphilosophy is that there is no way of assessing object level philosophical arguments”?
If the correct metaphilosophy is that you can assess object level arguments …then you can assess the object level arguments in the sequences....contra your original claim.
But suppose some other Less Wrong commenter disagrees with me; what then?
Then you can’t assess object level correctness. But you can still fix the overconfidence.
You have the option of rewriting the sequences to withdraw or tone down the disputed claims.
If the correct metaphilosophy is that there is no way of assessing object level philosophical arguments, then any confident assertion of a philosophical claim is metaphilosophically wrong. And there are plenty of confident assertions of philosophical claims in the sequences. In Torture versus Dust Specks and the Free Will sequence, for instance, there is supposed to be a 100% correct answer, not an argument for your consideration.
What if we disagree on whether “the correct metaphilosophy is that there is no way of assessing object level philosophical arguments”?
Look, I’m not saying that the Sequences are, philosophically speaking, pure and without sin (I give the opposite of Eliezer’s answer in “Torture vs. Dust Speaks”, and consider the free will sequence to be unpersuasive and confused). But suppose some other Less Wrong commenter disagrees with me; what then? We just get mired in philosophical arguments, right? Because that’s the only way to “resolve” these disputes: arguments. There’s nothing else to appeal to.
It’s just a fundamentally different situation, totally unlike the question of study replication or “does paper X actually mention topic Y at all” or anything else along these lines.
If the correct metaphilosophy is that you can assess object level arguments …then you can assess the object level arguments in the sequences....contra your original claim.
Then you can’t assess object level correctness. But you can still fix the overconfidence.
You have the option of rewriting the sequences to withdraw or tone down the disputed claims.