I question if anyone would truly be neutral to a world being split into two. Being neutral would imply that one may prefer receiving a small pleasure than giving an incomprehensibly large number of individuals fulfilling lives, if said individuals would be in a different universe. Though I know people tend to have scope insensitivity and care less about those who are outside their own “group,” the level of discrimination you’re suggesting seems hard to believe.
“world being split into two” here, means something that no one can really notice, even while seeing all existing observations: it’s a transition from “1 world that looks like X” to “2 worlds that look like X”. It’s meaningless, in my view, but it seems to be the basis of “measure”.
I would prefer receiving a small pleasure and having my measure halved than neither. This has nothing to do with selfishness.
Being neutral would imply that one may prefer receiving a small pleasure than giving an incomprehensibly large number of individuals fulfilling lives, if said individuals would be in a different universe.
That’s associated with being altruistic only towards your universe, or being selfish, which is distinct from the measure claim.
I know my argument is not too rigorous, and should not be used by someone deciding about cryonics now, but I think it deserves a rigorous response: if it’s wrong, it should be provably so. I would love to have an anthropic theory over different utility functions that was clear about when my argument works and when not.
“world being split into two” here, means something that no one can really notice, even while seeing all existing observations: it’s a transition from “1 world that looks like X” to “2 worlds that look like X”. It’s meaningless, in my view, but it seems to be the basis of “measure”.
Meaningless as in the word has literally no meaning, or as in the concept is unimportant?
I know my argument is not too rigorous, and should not be used by someone deciding about cryonics now, but I think it deserves a rigorous response: if it’s wrong, it should be provably so. I would love to have an anthropic >
theory over different utility functions that was clear about when my argument works and when not.
You haven’t really given an argument at all for or against your value system, nor have I. As far as I know, there’s no way to prove a value system is correct, because values are entirely subjective.
That’s associated with being altruistic only towards your universe, or being selfish, which is distinct from the measure claim.
Actually, it is associated with the measure claim, since the fulfilling lives could be caused by the universe splitting into two.
Meaningless as in the word has literally no meaning, or as in the concept is unimportant?
The latter. I’m willing to say that there could be some state of reality that corresponds to 1 world splitting into 2 identical worlds, but I don’t think that should factor into any utility function.
You haven’t really given an argument at all for or against your value system, nor have I. As far as I know, there’s no way to prove a value system is correct, because values are entirely subjective.
What I want to see is a rigorous argument for or against cryonics over popular value systems. I’m not sure that even EA over all existing universes would say to get it.
I will note that conventional wisdom (in cryonics) seems to be that selfish people should sign up, while my theory disagrees, so there is something to be analysed there.
Actually, it is associated with the measure claim, since the fulfilling lives could be caused by the universe splitting into two.
If my measure goes from , say, .1 to .05, and .05 universes cease to exist, that still shouldn’t matter to my utility, as long as those universes that don’t exist are exactly identical to the .05 that still exist with me.
When you say “universe splitting into two”, it refers to 2 universes that evolve exactly the same. I can’t gain something in one world in exchange for losing it in the other, or the 2 would be counted separately in my measure.
In your example of taking a pleasure and destroying worlds, every single person that would have led “fulfilling lives” with probability of X if I refuse the pleasure still leads fulfilling lives with the same probability of X. The only thing that changes is their measure, which doesn’t change anything, not even probabilities, as long as all measures change together. So even an altruist towards all worlds could say that it doesn’t matter how many copies of the exact worlds are, as long as the relative ratios are the same.
What I want to see is a rigorous argument for or against cryonics over popular value systems. I’m not sure that even EA over all existing universes would say to get it.
Ok, I misunderstood what you were referring to when you were talking about the proof. Please PM me if you ever formalize it; I’d like to read it.
Anyways, I see our utility function are radically different. I suppose there’s no use arguing about them.
I question if anyone would truly be neutral to a world being split into two. Being neutral would imply that one may prefer receiving a small pleasure than giving an incomprehensibly large number of individuals fulfilling lives, if said individuals would be in a different universe. Though I know people tend to have scope insensitivity and care less about those who are outside their own “group,” the level of discrimination you’re suggesting seems hard to believe.
“world being split into two” here, means something that no one can really notice, even while seeing all existing observations: it’s a transition from “1 world that looks like X” to “2 worlds that look like X”. It’s meaningless, in my view, but it seems to be the basis of “measure”.
I would prefer receiving a small pleasure and having my measure halved than neither. This has nothing to do with selfishness.
That’s associated with being altruistic only towards your universe, or being selfish, which is distinct from the measure claim.
I know my argument is not too rigorous, and should not be used by someone deciding about cryonics now, but I think it deserves a rigorous response: if it’s wrong, it should be provably so. I would love to have an anthropic theory over different utility functions that was clear about when my argument works and when not.
Meaningless as in the word has literally no meaning, or as in the concept is unimportant?
You haven’t really given an argument at all for or against your value system, nor have I. As far as I know, there’s no way to prove a value system is correct, because values are entirely subjective.
Actually, it is associated with the measure claim, since the fulfilling lives could be caused by the universe splitting into two.
The latter. I’m willing to say that there could be some state of reality that corresponds to 1 world splitting into 2 identical worlds, but I don’t think that should factor into any utility function.
What I want to see is a rigorous argument for or against cryonics over popular value systems. I’m not sure that even EA over all existing universes would say to get it.
I will note that conventional wisdom (in cryonics) seems to be that selfish people should sign up, while my theory disagrees, so there is something to be analysed there.
If my measure goes from , say, .1 to .05, and .05 universes cease to exist, that still shouldn’t matter to my utility, as long as those universes that don’t exist are exactly identical to the .05 that still exist with me.
When you say “universe splitting into two”, it refers to 2 universes that evolve exactly the same. I can’t gain something in one world in exchange for losing it in the other, or the 2 would be counted separately in my measure.
In your example of taking a pleasure and destroying worlds, every single person that would have led “fulfilling lives” with probability of X if I refuse the pleasure still leads fulfilling lives with the same probability of X. The only thing that changes is their measure, which doesn’t change anything, not even probabilities, as long as all measures change together. So even an altruist towards all worlds could say that it doesn’t matter how many copies of the exact worlds are, as long as the relative ratios are the same.
Ok, I misunderstood what you were referring to when you were talking about the proof. Please PM me if you ever formalize it; I’d like to read it.
Anyways, I see our utility function are radically different. I suppose there’s no use arguing about them.