Hallo, this is a chronophone call from 12 years in the future.
I would transmit a technical analysis of various voting systems, and the fundamental process they are meant to solve (simplistically: the process itself doesn’t add any information whatsoever, just condenses the noisy information in the ballots into a set of winning candidates—single-winner systems weakly tend to reduce variety). Some do a terrible job (FPTP selects the mode of the distribution) while some are quite involved (given the input containing orderings/scorings of labels, reconstruct a metric space those labels come from, and return the median).
Hopefully, this comes out as “autocrats sometimes rule according to the subjects’ morality, but when they don’t, there’s no system to remove/correct them”, and helps implement some form of democracy. Or I could just read The Dictator’s Handbook, though I have no idea what that would come out as.
Personal ideas:
I think the globally “standard” four-year terms (I was primarily thinking about my own country’s cabinets when I thought about this) are too short, as they leave no incentive to invest in infrastructure-like public goods (e.g. education) beyond its role as a crowd-pleaser. Even if there is no lead time for gathering information, planning, and implementation, most investments don’t make back their initial cost so soon.
On the other hand, even in a comparatively healthy system with multiple parties, the distribution of their popularities has approximately 2 bits of entropy (I used my own country’s election data). So, ~0.5bits/year public input… (Yes, there are other elections for local government that I didn’t count.)
Cheaper (thus more frequent), higher-bandwidth information input: legally binding polls, focus groups (analogy with juries?), “citizen boards” and other market research tools. I’ve not put too much thought into how to make them cheater-resistant yet.
Rethinking the separation of powers into those three bins. For instance, it’s not obvious to me why collecting evidence for the criminal side of the judicial system and putting down riots cluster together (with other functions) into what we label police. (Obvious counterexample—not meant as endorsement—being the places where armed policing is done by the military.) Or why are there near-duplicates for rule creation (“obey or else”) e.g. laws and decrees (or however executive-generated rules are called). (I’ve made these notes years before reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours.)
Note: FPTP doesn’t actually give the mode of the distribution of the population. If we assume a normal distribution centered at 0, with candidates at {-0.25σ, 0, 0.25σ}, even though candidate 0 represents the mode, most voters prefer either of the two candidates towards the tail, so candidate 0 receives the fewest votes, thereby losing
I didn’t mean the distribution of the population over the political compass. I meant the distribution of the votes over candidate-labels. FPTP doesn’t do any processing to discover facts (distances and directions between the candidates), just returns the mode == the candidate with the most votes.
Hallo, this is a chronophone call from 12 years in the future.
I would transmit a technical analysis of various voting systems, and the fundamental process they are meant to solve (simplistically: the process itself doesn’t add any information whatsoever, just condenses the noisy information in the ballots into a set of winning candidates—single-winner systems weakly tend to reduce variety). Some do a terrible job (FPTP selects the mode of the distribution) while some are quite involved (given the input containing orderings/scorings of labels, reconstruct a metric space those labels come from, and return the median).
Hopefully, this comes out as “autocrats sometimes rule according to the subjects’ morality, but when they don’t, there’s no system to remove/correct them”, and helps implement some form of democracy. Or I could just read The Dictator’s Handbook, though I have no idea what that would come out as.
Personal ideas:
I think the globally “standard” four-year terms (I was primarily thinking about my own country’s cabinets when I thought about this) are too short, as they leave no incentive to invest in infrastructure-like public goods (e.g. education) beyond its role as a crowd-pleaser. Even if there is no lead time for gathering information, planning, and implementation, most investments don’t make back their initial cost so soon.
On the other hand, even in a comparatively healthy system with multiple parties, the distribution of their popularities has approximately 2 bits of entropy (I used my own country’s election data). So, ~0.5bits/year public input… (Yes, there are other elections for local government that I didn’t count.)
Cheaper (thus more frequent), higher-bandwidth information input: legally binding polls, focus groups (analogy with juries?), “citizen boards” and other market research tools. I’ve not put too much thought into how to make them cheater-resistant yet.
Rethinking the separation of powers into those three bins. For instance, it’s not obvious to me why collecting evidence for the criminal side of the judicial system and putting down riots cluster together (with other functions) into what we label police. (Obvious counterexample—not meant as endorsement—being the places where armed policing is done by the military.) Or why are there near-duplicates for rule creation (“obey or else”) e.g. laws and decrees (or however executive-generated rules are called). (I’ve made these notes years before reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours.)
Note: FPTP doesn’t actually give the mode of the distribution of the population. If we assume a normal distribution centered at 0, with candidates at {-0.25σ, 0, 0.25σ}, even though candidate 0 represents the mode, most voters prefer either of the two candidates towards the tail, so candidate 0 receives the fewest votes, thereby losing
I didn’t mean the distribution of the population over the political compass. I meant the distribution of the votes over candidate-labels. FPTP doesn’t do any processing to discover facts (distances and directions between the candidates), just returns the mode == the candidate with the most votes.