It’s a feature of bad governments that they don’t allow people to leave (e.g. North Korea, DDR, etc.).
Also, many otherwise-good governments don’t allow people to enter, or at least not many.
There are many other sources of “friction” that would slow, or even negate many of the benefits cleonid expects. Language and culture might outweigh government for most people as reasons to stay versus move. Pure geographical location, for example astride a major trade route, might do likewise. Of course, a spectacularly bad government usually provides strong enough incentive to outweigh those considerations. So this is a good way to limit spectacularly bad governments, provided that you can ensure that people can escape them.
Language and culture might outweigh government for most people as reasons to stay versus move.
Certainly.
Essentially, this is a problem of incentives vs. costs. At present, high costs (such as language and culture barriers) prevent a socialist from Singapore and an economic conservative from Sweden from switching places. Likewise, a liberal from Huston and a conservative from San Francisco might stay put because of insufficiently high incentives (thanks to the central government the practical difference between living in Texas and California is not that big).
However, the situation is different when small territorial units within one mono-lingual country get real autonomy (e.g., the provinces of Holland and Zeland in the Dutch Republic). Then the competition for people becomes a real factor in their politics.
Also, many otherwise-good governments don’t allow people to enter, or at least not many.
There are many other sources of “friction” that would slow, or even negate many of the benefits cleonid expects. Language and culture might outweigh government for most people as reasons to stay versus move. Pure geographical location, for example astride a major trade route, might do likewise. Of course, a spectacularly bad government usually provides strong enough incentive to outweigh those considerations. So this is a good way to limit spectacularly bad governments, provided that you can ensure that people can escape them.
Certainly. Essentially, this is a problem of incentives vs. costs. At present, high costs (such as language and culture barriers) prevent a socialist from Singapore and an economic conservative from Sweden from switching places. Likewise, a liberal from Huston and a conservative from San Francisco might stay put because of insufficiently high incentives (thanks to the central government the practical difference between living in Texas and California is not that big).
However, the situation is different when small territorial units within one mono-lingual country get real autonomy (e.g., the provinces of Holland and Zeland in the Dutch Republic). Then the competition for people becomes a real factor in their politics.