I understand. I guess I am a little surprised that this forum has had problems with such views, given its intent.
I don’t know which of my own views are unusual or not though. I am sure reading more of the content here will help me assess this. I don’t know how commonly known, are notions of determinism, social engineering, or involuntary cultural identity. I may also be quite unskilled at describing such in a way which can change a mind. I don’t know.
We do not know what assumptions we already hold, which we do not or have not questioned, until something happens to highlight them, and bring them to conscious analysis. So, it seems safer to assume we all have such false assumptions than not. I hope to share some I have discovered within myself. Perhaps that may help others, or perhaps they will just say “D’uh”.
Perhaps I could find a more effective way to say: belief in objective free will is of much the same rational coherency as a belief in ghosts. Not provably impossible, but there is not much reason to fixate on either sans empiricism.
I don’t know if any of the above is interesting, or just mundane to you.
Would it be better to say: “Belief in objective free will is just as irrational as belief in ghosts?”, and then make a case to be tested?
I am a little surprised that this forum has had problems with such views
It’s not that the forum had problems, it’s just that this forum is quite vigilant about preventing such problems from appearing and spreading.
I don’t know which of my own views are unusual or not though.
Is there a particular reason for you to care? LW is quite insistent that whether your views are correct is much, much more important than whether they are popular.
belief in objective free will is of much the same rational coherency as a belief in ghosts
Eh. The issue of free will is discussed here on a regular basis. Eliezer’s take is here. Your assertion probably needs some clarification (e.g. what’s “objective” and how do you measure coherency?)
The reason I care, is because if I feel enthusiastic about writing a piece on a topic, I don’t want to bore others with what they have already considered. I don’t know what others have already considered. I quite agree that correct is far more important than popular or common.
“Objective” is what is still real, when you do not believe in it.
I’ve recently been examining the Sopolsky lectures on behavioural biology (25 part y-tube playlist from Stanford), and have had my view that objective free will is unlikely to exist in any practical way, thoroughly reinforced.
Feeling free, is rather different to being a free self determining agent.
It is remarkably useful to note that what “is”, is not necessarily what we think/believe “is” real.
Subjective reality vs objective reality. Never the twain shall meet… but our subjective position on what is real and true, can come closer to the objective foundation on which our minds are built. The journey to attain greater subjective accuracy of our understanding of the [objective] universe… is the pursuit of … being more correct… and less wrong… and is of great value.
This is more about “Prima facie”, as a legal and rational term. On face value, we weigh evidence, intending to look anew. We must consciously discard existing assumptions, in order to consciously re-asses the topic of free will.
We accept that:
-in utero nutrients and stress for the mother can affect behaviour later.
-A horridly abusive childhood influences behaviour later.
-A hot day can alter a person’s cognitive ability.
-Low blood sugar can affect emotional intensity and cognitive ability.
...There are so many circumstantial factors which influence our thinking, involuntarily, that they must be considered overwhelming.
Competing with all of that evidence for why people behave the way they do (sociology, psychology, neurology, etc) is the experience of “being” oneself. An agent of one’s own story.
The narrative we create for ourselves, about why we do what we do, presently seems to come after the biological and circumstantial reaction to influences on us. From this position (so far an empirical one) we can surmise that our own personal narrative is more of a post-reaction rationalisation, and not actually something which could be called “free” or “agency” or “independence”.
However, because we cannot be certain that free will is not some metaphysical, sans-causation “force” (sorry for lack of a better term) we cannot presently explain, we must accept that free will is not disprovable. Much like God.
We have a weight of empirical evidence which explains influences upon people, and it is opposed by “feelings”, culture, religion, and subjective experience. Anecdotal stories promote free will. These are the same as thinking a dream is real at the time, or thinking the room is warm when really you have a fever. This is subjective experience, not empiricism.
We can doubt (Descartes) pretty much anything from an epistemological point of view, but after that, we still have to accept that there is a weight of evidence one way or another. This is our (limited) guide for our rational positions.
The weight of evidence leads us to see that advertising exists because it works. An influence designed to corrupt rational choice, still exists because it is effective.
We are all unaware of two major influences on our actions. One is bias. Irrational bias exists as an influence on us, largely because we are unaware of it. We cannot compensate for a bias of which we are unaware. The other big influence is the cultural indoctrination of ideas we have ceased to question. We do not question foundational cognitive items, if it does not occur to us to do so. We don’t know what our assumptions are, until something happens to revel them.
The more likely, evidence based scenario, is that we are far more reactionary, involuntary actors, than not. On top of that, we are more likely to rationalise our own agency post-neurology, post-influence, than to be “free” agents. Then we arrive back at the idea that our own subjective experience of agency and “self” is involuntary.
I hope that helps further the discourse.
I’m sorry I am unfamiliar with Thomas Kuhn’s work, I will examine it soon. In the sense that a statement’s opposite ought to be true, if the statement is true… I’m not sure how to apply that to personal subjectivity of self and the involuntary narrative we observe ourselves observing. hehe.
There are so many circumstantial factors which influence our thinking, involuntarily, that they must be considered overwhelming.
I don’t see any reason for that must.
Consider driving. There are so many factors which influence where the car is going—from gravity to roads—and yet, you are driving.
we can surmise that our own personal narrative is more of a post-reaction rationalisation
I don’t think we can. It is possible, of course, for you to take the position that it’s turtles all the way down, that is, that the next moment in time is fully and mechanically determined by the state of the universe at the previous moment, including your brain and your consciousness, but this approach is also not provable or disprovable and doesn’t look to be too useful for anything.
This is subjective experience, not empiricism.
How do you gain any information about the outside world other than through subjective experiences?
we still have to accept that there is a weight of evidence one way or another
Not so. “I don’t know” is a perfectly good answer. Honest, too.
we are far more reactionary, involuntary actors, than not
That’s a different claim. It’s one thing thing for you to say that free will does not exist at all—as you do in the beginning of the comment—and quite another thing to start talking about the degree to which our (free-will) decision-making is influenced by factors we’re not conscious of.
I understand. I guess I am a little surprised that this forum has had problems with such views, given its intent.
I don’t know which of my own views are unusual or not though. I am sure reading more of the content here will help me assess this. I don’t know how commonly known, are notions of determinism, social engineering, or involuntary cultural identity. I may also be quite unskilled at describing such in a way which can change a mind. I don’t know.
We do not know what assumptions we already hold, which we do not or have not questioned, until something happens to highlight them, and bring them to conscious analysis. So, it seems safer to assume we all have such false assumptions than not. I hope to share some I have discovered within myself. Perhaps that may help others, or perhaps they will just say “D’uh”.
Perhaps I could find a more effective way to say: belief in objective free will is of much the same rational coherency as a belief in ghosts. Not provably impossible, but there is not much reason to fixate on either sans empiricism.
I don’t know if any of the above is interesting, or just mundane to you. Would it be better to say: “Belief in objective free will is just as irrational as belief in ghosts?”, and then make a case to be tested?
It’s not that the forum had problems, it’s just that this forum is quite vigilant about preventing such problems from appearing and spreading.
Is there a particular reason for you to care? LW is quite insistent that whether your views are correct is much, much more important than whether they are popular.
Eh. The issue of free will is discussed here on a regular basis. Eliezer’s take is here. Your assertion probably needs some clarification (e.g. what’s “objective” and how do you measure coherency?)
The reason I care, is because if I feel enthusiastic about writing a piece on a topic, I don’t want to bore others with what they have already considered. I don’t know what others have already considered. I quite agree that correct is far more important than popular or common.
“Objective” is what is still real, when you do not believe in it.
Bored people can click over to another post very easily. If you feel enthusiastic, do it.
Not a terrible useful definition when applied to free will.
(The canonical form of the above is “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away” -- Philip K. Dick)
Thanks for the PK Dick origin. I’m grateful.
I’ve recently been examining the Sopolsky lectures on behavioural biology (25 part y-tube playlist from Stanford), and have had my view that objective free will is unlikely to exist in any practical way, thoroughly reinforced.
Feeling free, is rather different to being a free self determining agent.
It is remarkably useful to note that what “is”, is not necessarily what we think/believe “is” real.
Subjective reality vs objective reality. Never the twain shall meet… but our subjective position on what is real and true, can come closer to the objective foundation on which our minds are built. The journey to attain greater subjective accuracy of our understanding of the [objective] universe… is the pursuit of … being more correct… and less wrong… and is of great value.
Is there any kind of empirical test which can answer whether free will is objective or not?
In Kuhnian terms, is there a falsifiable statement somewhere in here?
This is more about “Prima facie”, as a legal and rational term. On face value, we weigh evidence, intending to look anew. We must consciously discard existing assumptions, in order to consciously re-asses the topic of free will.
We accept that: -in utero nutrients and stress for the mother can affect behaviour later. -A horridly abusive childhood influences behaviour later. -A hot day can alter a person’s cognitive ability. -Low blood sugar can affect emotional intensity and cognitive ability.
...There are so many circumstantial factors which influence our thinking, involuntarily, that they must be considered overwhelming.
Competing with all of that evidence for why people behave the way they do (sociology, psychology, neurology, etc) is the experience of “being” oneself. An agent of one’s own story.
The narrative we create for ourselves, about why we do what we do, presently seems to come after the biological and circumstantial reaction to influences on us. From this position (so far an empirical one) we can surmise that our own personal narrative is more of a post-reaction rationalisation, and not actually something which could be called “free” or “agency” or “independence”.
However, because we cannot be certain that free will is not some metaphysical, sans-causation “force” (sorry for lack of a better term) we cannot presently explain, we must accept that free will is not disprovable. Much like God.
We have a weight of empirical evidence which explains influences upon people, and it is opposed by “feelings”, culture, religion, and subjective experience. Anecdotal stories promote free will. These are the same as thinking a dream is real at the time, or thinking the room is warm when really you have a fever. This is subjective experience, not empiricism.
We can doubt (Descartes) pretty much anything from an epistemological point of view, but after that, we still have to accept that there is a weight of evidence one way or another. This is our (limited) guide for our rational positions.
The weight of evidence leads us to see that advertising exists because it works. An influence designed to corrupt rational choice, still exists because it is effective.
We are all unaware of two major influences on our actions. One is bias. Irrational bias exists as an influence on us, largely because we are unaware of it. We cannot compensate for a bias of which we are unaware. The other big influence is the cultural indoctrination of ideas we have ceased to question. We do not question foundational cognitive items, if it does not occur to us to do so. We don’t know what our assumptions are, until something happens to revel them.
The more likely, evidence based scenario, is that we are far more reactionary, involuntary actors, than not. On top of that, we are more likely to rationalise our own agency post-neurology, post-influence, than to be “free” agents. Then we arrive back at the idea that our own subjective experience of agency and “self” is involuntary.
I hope that helps further the discourse.
I’m sorry I am unfamiliar with Thomas Kuhn’s work, I will examine it soon. In the sense that a statement’s opposite ought to be true, if the statement is true… I’m not sure how to apply that to personal subjectivity of self and the involuntary narrative we observe ourselves observing. hehe.
I don’t see any reason for that must.
Consider driving. There are so many factors which influence where the car is going—from gravity to roads—and yet, you are driving.
I don’t think we can. It is possible, of course, for you to take the position that it’s turtles all the way down, that is, that the next moment in time is fully and mechanically determined by the state of the universe at the previous moment, including your brain and your consciousness, but this approach is also not provable or disprovable and doesn’t look to be too useful for anything.
How do you gain any information about the outside world other than through subjective experiences?
Not so. “I don’t know” is a perfectly good answer. Honest, too.
That’s a different claim. It’s one thing thing for you to say that free will does not exist at all—as you do in the beginning of the comment—and quite another thing to start talking about the degree to which our (free-will) decision-making is influenced by factors we’re not conscious of.