People can believe in unempirical things. That’s a fact—an empirical one, if you like. The standard theory that treats beliefs as linguistic, sentence-like things
can handle such beliefs.. The question is whether the Possible Experience theory can.
Ah, I think I see what you’re saying. We’re getting tangled up about the meaning of the word “belief” (also about faelore, but we’ll ignore that for now).
If someone speaks of a flour-permeable dragon, would you say they “believe” the dragon exists? I think most people here wouldn’t. But it’s just a disagreement about a word.
People can believe in unempirical things. That’s a fact—an empirical one, if you like. The standard theory that treats beliefs as linguistic, sentence-like things can handle such beliefs.
People can get wrong answers when they do math problems, but that doesn’t make two plus two equal five.
Sorry, I should have made my metaphor clearer. According to what you’ve termed Possible Experience theory, if a person claims to have a “belief” about something unempirical, they’re wrong. A theory that explains why people sometimes say “two plus two equals five” is a theory of psychology, not a theory of arithmetic; similarly, a theory that explains why people sometimes say things like “there is an invisible dragon in my garage” is a theory of psychology and not a theory of epistemology.
If you can think of a better word than “belief” for me to use when I mean something like “portion of a human’s model of the universe”, fine, we can use that word instead, but I’d rather not argue about the meanings of words right now.
if a person claims to have a “belief” about something unempirical, they’re wrong.
Why si that relevant? The question is how to explain belief:-
“To me it seem the problem here is simply trying to treat natural language sentences as real things when they are only an approximate abstraction, that breaks down in these kinds of edge cases.
There are no discrete “belief’s” with “justifications”, there are only a probability distribution over the configuration space of all possible histories of sensory input. And that’s just another layer of abstraction really, but it’s enough for now.”
Wrong beliefs exist
A theory that explains why people sometimes say “two plus two equals five” is a theory of psychology
exactly.
similarly, a theory that explains why people sometimes say things like “there is an invisible dragon in my garage” is a theory of psychology and not a theory of epistemology.
how does a belief in invisible pixies relate to possible experience?
If you are picnicking in the woods and a loaf of bread you’re looking at just vanishes, you have possibly experienced theft by an invisible pixie.
People can believe in unempirical things. That’s a fact—an empirical one, if you like. The standard theory that treats beliefs as linguistic, sentence-like things can handle such beliefs.. The question is whether the Possible Experience theory can.
Ah, I think I see what you’re saying. We’re getting tangled up about the meaning of the word “belief” (also about faelore, but we’ll ignore that for now).
If someone speaks of a flour-permeable dragon, would you say they “believe” the dragon exists? I think most people here wouldn’t. But it’s just a disagreement about a word.
People can get wrong answers when they do math problems, but that doesn’t make two plus two equal five.
What is that relevant to?
Sorry, I should have made my metaphor clearer. According to what you’ve termed Possible Experience theory, if a person claims to have a “belief” about something unempirical, they’re wrong. A theory that explains why people sometimes say “two plus two equals five” is a theory of psychology, not a theory of arithmetic; similarly, a theory that explains why people sometimes say things like “there is an invisible dragon in my garage” is a theory of psychology and not a theory of epistemology.
If you can think of a better word than “belief” for me to use when I mean something like “portion of a human’s model of the universe”, fine, we can use that word instead, but I’d rather not argue about the meanings of words right now.
Why si that relevant? The question is how to explain belief:-
“To me it seem the problem here is simply trying to treat natural language sentences as real things when they are only an approximate abstraction, that breaks down in these kinds of edge cases.
There are no discrete “belief’s” with “justifications”, there are only a probability distribution over the configuration space of all possible histories of sensory input. And that’s just another layer of abstraction really, but it’s enough for now.”
Wrong beliefs exist
exactly.
Epistemology can’t ignore falsehood.
I think trolls.
I am an awful person. :(