If these uploads are p-zombies (Scott-zombies?) because they are reversible computations, then their welfare doesn’t matter. I don’t think he says that it prevents paperclip maximizers.
He suggests that all those uploads might not be conscious if they are run on a quantum computer reversibly (or have some other “clean digital abstraction layer”). He states that this is a huge speculation, but it is still an alternative not usually considered by the orthodox reductionists.
If these uploads are p-zombies (Scott-zombies?) because they are reversible computations, then their welfare doesn’t matter. I don’t think he says that it prevents paperclip maximizers.
So Scott meant to argue against “the future should involve trillions of uploads” rather than “the future will involve trillions of uploads”?
He suggests that all those uploads might not be conscious if they are run on a quantum computer reversibly (or have some other “clean digital abstraction layer”). He states that this is a huge speculation, but it is still an alternative not usually considered by the orthodox reductionists.