Hmm, is this not the correct solution for two super-rational players:
Player One: Pick C with probability of 2⁄3 - e; pick B with probability of 1⁄3 + e, e being some very small but not negligible number.
Player Two: Pick Y
Expected payoff for Player One is 4 2⁄3 −4e; way better than playing A. For B is 2⁄3 + 2 e, a tiny bit better than playing X—so B will play Y, since he knows that A is totally rational and would have picked this very strategy.
Hmm, is this not the correct solution for two super-rational players:
Player One: Pick C with probability of 2⁄3 - e; pick B with probability of 1⁄3 + e, e being some very small but not negligible number. Player Two: Pick Y
Expected payoff for Player One is 4 2⁄3 −4e; way better than playing A. For B is 2⁄3 + 2 e, a tiny bit better than playing X—so B will play Y, since he knows that A is totally rational and would have picked this very strategy.