This, I think, is a major part of it, that it doesn’t seem you’ve accounted for:
The “free will” debate is a confusion because, to answer the question on the grounds of the libertarians is to already cede their position. The question they ask: “Can I make choices, or does physics determine what I do?”
Implicit in that question is a definition of the self that already assumes dualism. The questions treats the self as a ghost in the machine, or a philosophy student of perfect emptiness. The libertarians imagine that we should be able to make decisions not only apart from physics, but apart from anything. They are treating the mind as a blank slate that should be able to take in information and output consequences based on nothing whatsoever.
If, instead, you apply the patternist theory of mind, you start with the self as “an ongoing collection of memories and personality traits.” (Simplified, of course.) From that point, you can reduce the question to a reductio ad absurdum. Say that one of my personality traits is a love and compassion for animals, and we’re asking the question, “Do I have the free will to run over this squirrel?” Replace “physics” with “personality”: Can I make the choice to run over this squirrel, or does my personality decide what I do?
THAT doesn’t seem so confusing to us. OF COURSE your personality and memories decide your actions. If you decided to run over the squirrel out of deathlust, you would probably think you’ve gone temporarily insane or somesuch. You would probably feel as if it wasn’t really you who decided to kill the squirrel. It’s possible for it to happen, but only if events out of your control come in and zap your mind with the temporary crazies. It is perfectly normal for your decisions to be decided by things that you cannot directly control yourself, and nobody seems to have a problem with this.
The case is no different for physics.
I’d start with that. From there, the explanation of why people get think they have libertarian free will should make more sense. We can imagine ourselves killing the squirrel, which leads us to believe we have libertarian free will. But that is irrelevant: someone who actually chose to kill the squirrel would be a different set of memories and personality traits, and it should not be controversial that they would also be a somewhat different physical makeup.
Can I make the choice to run over this squirrel, or does my personality decide what I do?
Who is “I”? What is there distinct from your personality that would be making this decision? There is suspiciously dualistic language throughout this post.
You would probably feel as if it wasn’t really you who decided to kill the squirrel.
You would? You’d really feel like some sort of external being took over? I suppose if a person was highly dissociated they might feel like this.
I think it’s more likely you just “wouldn’t know” (or wouldn’t consciously admit) why you decided to make a decision contrary to your evident personality. The truth would probably be that part of your brain actually liked the idea of splatting a squirrel at that particular moment, but justifying one’s actions as a slayer of helpless little squirrels is troublesome and so the decision came to be regretted and disowned by other parts of your cognitive machinery.
Since various studies have shown that unconscious decisions actually precede conscious awareness of a decision, it seems likely that the experience of free will simply provides the conscious mind an opportunity to weave an appropriately believable and self-flattering explanation for behavior one has already determined on executing. I’m drawing mostly on Kurzban in using this sort of language....
Apologies for the dualistic language. I am simply not the best writer, and if anyone wants to take a stab at cleaning the point up, I’d be quite happy.
You’re right that you probably wouldn’t feel like someone else took over. I kind of doubt you’d feel you wouldn’t know, either. Or rather: You wouldn’t know after the fact, but you probably would know during the fact. It would probably feel like being extremely high, and doing one of the ridiculous things we humans do when we’re in those states.
I agree that unconscious decisions usually precede conscious justifications. I figure that these are a large part of what makes a “personality,” and might further explain why personalities are so inflexible across time. Unless I’m greatly confused!
The “free will” debate is a confusion because, to answer the question on the grounds of the libertarians is to already cede their position. The question they ask: “Can I make choices, or does physics determine what I do?”
Implicit in that question is a definition of the self that already assumes dualism. The questions treats the self as a ghost in the machine, or a philosophy student of perfect emptiness.
The concern of libertaarians is actually that external events determine what they do. They don’t mind their actions being caused by neural events in their brain. A libertarian may accept that they are constituted of physics but that is not the same thing as being determined by physics. Being constituted of physical stuff is on the face of it neutral with regard to determinism and libertarianism.
The libertarians imagine that we should be able to make decisions not only apart from physics, but apart from anything.
No. The phrase typicall used is “not entirely determined by”.
You mean “libertarian” in the literal sense right?
“literal sense”—is that the most clear question you can ask? If someone replied ‘yes’ or ‘no’, how would you be sure that you’d not both be suffering from a double illusion of transparency regarding what the ‘literal sense’ of the word was?
This, I think, is a major part of it, that it doesn’t seem you’ve accounted for:
The “free will” debate is a confusion because, to answer the question on the grounds of the libertarians is to already cede their position. The question they ask: “Can I make choices, or does physics determine what I do?”
Implicit in that question is a definition of the self that already assumes dualism. The questions treats the self as a ghost in the machine, or a philosophy student of perfect emptiness. The libertarians imagine that we should be able to make decisions not only apart from physics, but apart from anything. They are treating the mind as a blank slate that should be able to take in information and output consequences based on nothing whatsoever.
If, instead, you apply the patternist theory of mind, you start with the self as “an ongoing collection of memories and personality traits.” (Simplified, of course.) From that point, you can reduce the question to a reductio ad absurdum. Say that one of my personality traits is a love and compassion for animals, and we’re asking the question, “Do I have the free will to run over this squirrel?” Replace “physics” with “personality”: Can I make the choice to run over this squirrel, or does my personality decide what I do?
THAT doesn’t seem so confusing to us. OF COURSE your personality and memories decide your actions. If you decided to run over the squirrel out of deathlust, you would probably think you’ve gone temporarily insane or somesuch. You would probably feel as if it wasn’t really you who decided to kill the squirrel. It’s possible for it to happen, but only if events out of your control come in and zap your mind with the temporary crazies. It is perfectly normal for your decisions to be decided by things that you cannot directly control yourself, and nobody seems to have a problem with this.
The case is no different for physics.
I’d start with that. From there, the explanation of why people get think they have libertarian free will should make more sense. We can imagine ourselves killing the squirrel, which leads us to believe we have libertarian free will. But that is irrelevant: someone who actually chose to kill the squirrel would be a different set of memories and personality traits, and it should not be controversial that they would also be a somewhat different physical makeup.
Can I make the choice to run over this squirrel, or does my personality decide what I do?
Who is “I”? What is there distinct from your personality that would be making this decision? There is suspiciously dualistic language throughout this post.
You would probably feel as if it wasn’t really you who decided to kill the squirrel.
You would? You’d really feel like some sort of external being took over? I suppose if a person was highly dissociated they might feel like this.
I think it’s more likely you just “wouldn’t know” (or wouldn’t consciously admit) why you decided to make a decision contrary to your evident personality. The truth would probably be that part of your brain actually liked the idea of splatting a squirrel at that particular moment, but justifying one’s actions as a slayer of helpless little squirrels is troublesome and so the decision came to be regretted and disowned by other parts of your cognitive machinery.
Since various studies have shown that unconscious decisions actually precede conscious awareness of a decision, it seems likely that the experience of free will simply provides the conscious mind an opportunity to weave an appropriately believable and self-flattering explanation for behavior one has already determined on executing. I’m drawing mostly on Kurzban in using this sort of language....
Apologies for the dualistic language. I am simply not the best writer, and if anyone wants to take a stab at cleaning the point up, I’d be quite happy.
You’re right that you probably wouldn’t feel like someone else took over. I kind of doubt you’d feel you wouldn’t know, either. Or rather: You wouldn’t know after the fact, but you probably would know during the fact. It would probably feel like being extremely high, and doing one of the ridiculous things we humans do when we’re in those states.
I agree that unconscious decisions usually precede conscious justifications. I figure that these are a large part of what makes a “personality,” and might further explain why personalities are so inflexible across time. Unless I’m greatly confused!
The concern of libertaarians is actually that external events determine what they do. They don’t mind their actions being caused by neural events in their brain. A libertarian may accept that they are constituted of physics but that is not the same thing as being determined by physics. Being constituted of physical stuff is on the face of it neutral with regard to determinism and libertarianism.
No. The phrase typicall used is “not entirely determined by”.
You mean “libertarian” in the literal sense right? You’re not implying that the subject of “free will” has anything to do with politics are you?
“literal sense”—is that the most clear question you can ask? If someone replied ‘yes’ or ‘no’, how would you be sure that you’d not both be suffering from a double illusion of transparency regarding what the ‘literal sense’ of the word was?
Either way, google and wikipedia are your friends: Libertarianism (metaphysics)
Yeah, I meant metaphysical libertarianism.
Can I quote this on the course forum?
If you like. I’m not sure it’s really a good explanation of Eliezer’s position, but it’s how I figure it.
It’s a good point anyway. Thanks.