“Outside circumstances” including what? Your definition is too vague.
As far as I’ve been able to tell, the question is confused. Before you ask what it is, first you must define what free will is, in a rigorous and exclusive manner; your definition shouldn’t include things you don’t want it to include, nor should it exclude things you don’t want to exclude. You’ve managed to include everything you want included, but your definition fails to exclude things you don’t want included—namely, your definition includes Eliezer’s definition.
Because Eliezer isn’t describing how we could experience free will even where free will doesn’t exist, he’s offering a definition of what free will is. Once you use Eliezer’s definition, the confusion goes away—the question becomes meaningless.
Anything. If my choices are fully determined by anything outside of me, they are not my choices.
Your definition is too vague.
I didn’t specify which outside circumstances because it doens;t matter.
namely, your definition includes Eliezer’s definition.
No Feelings aren’t abilities. An ability to choose does not concptually include a feeling of freedom.
Because Eliezer isn’t describing how we could experience free will even where free will doesn’t exist, he’s offering a definition of what free will is.
A re-definition. A different definition, Hence he is not answering or disolving the original question.
Once you use Eliezer’s definition, the confusion goes away—the question becomes meaningless.
That is false. Once you start using a different definition, you start talking about something else. Changing the subject is not dissolving the question.
To what extent? If something outside your nervous system enters into your nervous system—say, LSD—does it qualify as internal? Does it only count if you chose to imbibe it, or would it also count if somebody else forced you to, or if circumstance forced it upon you (say, you consumed something unknowingly)?
Oh good grief. You can call anything vague if you set the bar high enough. Am I being significantly more vague than EY was?
ETA:
Woops, looks the people who wite the Skeptic’s Dictionary are mystical trolls too:
“Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. ”
Yes. I understood precisely what Eliezer was referring to.
Whereas I have no idea whatsoever what you’re referring to. Elaborating:
You state that the question of free will comes down to:
“Whether some organisms have the ability to make choices that aren’t fully determined by outside circumstances.”
When asked to define “outside circumstances,” drilling down, it becomes anything outside the central nervous system.
Which leaves the question in an uncomfortable position whereby it is calling dualism a form of determinism. Indeed, any solution which posits a non-reductionist answer to the question of free will is being called determinism by your definition.
Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you’ve left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they’ve -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is “fully determined” by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism. Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric. To say Eliezer hasn’t answered it in that context is to complain that he didn’t preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.
Which leads me right back to “You have to be trolling.”
Which leaves the question in an uncomfortable position whereby it is calling dualism a form of determinism. Indeed, any solution which posits a non-reductionist answer to the question of free will is being called determinism by your definition.
A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question “what is outside” because I thought there weren’t any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?
Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you’ve left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they’ve -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is “fully determined” by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism.
Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn’t call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified
what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.
Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric.
I have no idea what you mean by that.
To say Eliezer hasn’t answered it in that context is to complain that he didn’t preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.
He hasn’t answered the question of FW because he hasn’t said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.
A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question “what is outside” because I thought there weren’t any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?
Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you’ve left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they’ve -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is “fully determined” by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism.
Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn’t call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified
what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.
Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric.
I have no ide what you mean by that.
To say Eliezer hasn’t answered it in that context is to complain that he didn’t preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.
He hasn’t answered the question of FW because he hasn’t said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.
“Outside circumstances” including what? Your definition is too vague.
As far as I’ve been able to tell, the question is confused. Before you ask what it is, first you must define what free will is, in a rigorous and exclusive manner; your definition shouldn’t include things you don’t want it to include, nor should it exclude things you don’t want to exclude. You’ve managed to include everything you want included, but your definition fails to exclude things you don’t want included—namely, your definition includes Eliezer’s definition.
Because Eliezer isn’t describing how we could experience free will even where free will doesn’t exist, he’s offering a definition of what free will is. Once you use Eliezer’s definition, the confusion goes away—the question becomes meaningless.
Anything. If my choices are fully determined by anything outside of me, they are not my choices.
I didn’t specify which outside circumstances because it doens;t matter.
No Feelings aren’t abilities. An ability to choose does not concptually include a feeling of freedom.
A re-definition. A different definition, Hence he is not answering or disolving the original question.
That is false. Once you start using a different definition, you start talking about something else. Changing the subject is not dissolving the question.
Define “outside of me.” Does a proton in your brain count as outside of you? What about a neuron?
Outside of my control systems, my CNS.
To what extent? If something outside your nervous system enters into your nervous system—say, LSD—does it qualify as internal? Does it only count if you chose to imbibe it, or would it also count if somebody else forced you to, or if circumstance forced it upon you (say, you consumed something unknowingly)?
Whatever. I have given as much detail as is needed for a philsophical definition. Definitions aren’t theories.
Intentional preservation of vagueness. You’re either a troll or a mystic. I think the “troll” description is probably less insulting in this context.
Oh good grief. You can call anything vague if you set the bar high enough. Am I being significantly more vague than EY was?
ETA:
Woops, looks the people who wite the Skeptic’s Dictionary are mystical trolls too:
“Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. ”
Yes. I understood precisely what Eliezer was referring to.
Whereas I have no idea whatsoever what you’re referring to. Elaborating:
You state that the question of free will comes down to: “Whether some organisms have the ability to make choices that aren’t fully determined by outside circumstances.”
When asked to define “outside circumstances,” drilling down, it becomes anything outside the central nervous system.
Which leaves the question in an uncomfortable position whereby it is calling dualism a form of determinism. Indeed, any solution which posits a non-reductionist answer to the question of free will is being called determinism by your definition.
Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you’ve left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they’ve -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is “fully determined” by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism. Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric. To say Eliezer hasn’t answered it in that context is to complain that he didn’t preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.
Which leads me right back to “You have to be trolling.”
A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question “what is outside” because I thought there weren’t any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?
Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn’t call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.
I have no idea what you mean by that.
He hasn’t answered the question of FW because he hasn’t said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.
A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question “what is outside” because I thought there weren’t any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?
Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn’t call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.
I have no ide what you mean by that.
He hasn’t answered the question of FW because he hasn’t said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.
Then philosophical definitions must not be enough to answer questions. Hardly new information.
[Edited for tone.]